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KNIVES AND THE SECOND AMENDMENT
David B. Kopel,1 Clayton E. Cramer2 & Joseph Edward Olson3
This Article is the first scholarly analysis of knives and the Second Amendment.
Under the Supreme Court’s standard in District of Columbia v. Heller, knives
are Second Amendment “arms” because they are “typically possessed by law-abiding
citizens for lawful purposes,” including self-defense.
There is no knife that is more dangerous than a modern handgun; to the contrary,
knives are much less dangerous. Therefore, restrictions on carrying handguns set
the upper limit for restrictions on carrying knives.
Prohibitions on carrying knives in general, or of particular knives, are unconstitu-
tional. For example, bans of knives that open in a convenient way (e.g.,
switchblades, gravity knives, and butterfly knives) are unconstitutional. Likewise
unconstitutional are bans on folding knives that, after being opened, have a safety
lock to prevent inadvertent closure.
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INTRODUCTION
Although Second Amendment cases and scholarship have fo-
cused on guns, the Second Amendment does not protect the right
to keep and bear firearms. The Amendment protects “arms,” of
which firearms are only one category. Only about half of U.S.
households possess a firearm, and many of those households have
only one or two firearms.4 In contrast, almost every household pos-
sesses several knives, not including table knives. This Article
analyzes Second Amendment protection for the most common
“arm” in the United States—the knife.
Part I explains the differences among various types of edged
weapons. It covers bayonets, swords, folding knives, automatic
knives, switchblades, gravity knives, butterfly knives, and the targets
of knife control in the nineteenth century, namely Bowie knives
and Arkansas Toothpicks. After a review of the knives, Part II pro-
vides criminological data in support of the intuitively obvious
proposition that knives are less dangerous than guns. Part III then
analyzes the important nineteenth century jurisprudence involving
Bowie knives and Arkansas Toothpicks. Part IV concludes the back-
ground review for why knives, as weapons, are constitutionally
protected arms and argues that the Second Amendment protects
knives generally, thus including all of the knives discussed in the
earlier parts (with the possible exception of the now-obscure Arkan-
sas Toothpick).
Part V considers the various standards of review that have been
used for Second Amendment cases after the Supreme Court’s stan-
dard-setting decision in District of Columbia v. Heller. Applying even
the weakest relevant standard of review, intermediate scrutiny, it
seems clear that some knife laws are unconstitutional, namely: bans
on knives that open in a convenient manner, such as switchblades,
gravity knives, and butterfly knives; bans on folding knives that have
a safety lock; and laws that restrict carrying knives more stringently
than carrying handguns. Part VI of this Article bolsters the argu-
ment that knives are constitutionally protected arms and describes
some of the more oppressive, and likely unconstitutional, knife con-
trol laws in various states and cities.
4. Variable Owngun: Have Gun in Home, GENERAL SOCIAL SURVEY, http://www3.norc.
org/GSS+Website/Browse+GSS+Variables/Subject+Index/ (follow “G” hyperlink; then fol-
low “Guns” hyperlink; then follow “Ownership” hyperlink; then follow “HAVE GUN IN
HOME” hyperlink) (last visited Aug. 20, 2013) (when asked if they had a gun in their home,
44.3 percent of those polled said yes, 54.9 percent no, and 0.8 percent refused to answer);
GARY KLECK, POINT BLANK: GUNS AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 54 (1991).
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I. KNIVES BY TYPE
In the movie Crocodile Dundee (1986), when the hero is
threatened by a New York City criminal with a switchblade, he says,
“That’s not a knife” and then pulls out a much larger blade and
says, “That’s a knife!”5 Defining the different types of knives is a nec-
essary first step because so much of the history of laws regulating
knives is built around distinguishing which types of knives were reg-
ulated. Even so, the definition of many knife terms, as used in
legislation and common parlance, is very unclear.
For modern general usage of the word knife, Wiktionary.com is a
good guide. The website offers three definitions:
1. A utensil or a tool designed for cutting, consisting of a
flat piece of hard material, usually steel or other metal (the
blade), usually sharpened on one edge, attached to a handle.
The blade may be pointed for piercing.
2. A weapon designed with the aforementioned specifica-
tions intended for slashing and/or stabbing and too short to
be called a sword. A dagger.6
3. Any blade-like part in a tool or a machine designed for
cutting, such as the knives for a chipper.7
This Article will ignore the third definition, which relates to the
knives or blades in machines, such as wood-chippers. For the first
definition (tools and utensils) and the second definition (short
weapons), the physical description is the same; only the purpose of
the knife is different. This Article focuses on “knife” as used in both
the first and second definitions. In practice, most knives are suita-
ble as tools and as weapons, but, of course, the reason that the
Second Amendment is relevant to knives is their use as a weapon,
which the first two definitions, and not the third, cover.
This Part presents an overview of knife use, the different types of
knives, and how they are distinguished for legal and functional pur-
poses.  In addition, it details how many of the legal distinctions
5. Actually, the knife in the movie was a prop, and there was no real knife like it. In
response to consumer demand, one company has started making a real knife that is a near-
replica of the movie knife. See Fletcher Knives, Crocodile Dundee Knife Finally in Production!!!!,
BLADEFORUMS.COM (May 1, 2010, 9:10 AM), http://www.bladeforums.com/forums/show
thread.php/737272-Crocodile-Dundee-knife-finally-in-production!!!!. Of course, in New York
City, carrying either of those knives is illegal. See N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 10-133 (2010).
6. In the interest of precision, it should be noted that a “dagger” is a type of knife; all
daggers are knives, but most knives are not daggers.
7. Knife, WIKTIONARY, http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/knife (last updated July 11, 2013,
10:19 PM).
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between different types of knives are based on perception, rather
than objective definitions related to public safety or the nature of
the right to keep and bear arms.
A. Knives as Tools
By far the most frequent use of a knife is as a tool. As the Oregon
Supreme Court observed in 1984 while summarizing the history of
knives in America, “[i]t is clear, then, that knives have played an
important role in American life, both as tools and as weapons. The
folding pocketknife, in particular, since the early 18th century has
been commonly carried by men in America and used primarily for
work, but also for fighting.”8
The twentieth century, the penknife was an essential accessory
for every student or literate adult.9 As the name suggests, the pen-
knife was used for cutting and slitting a quill or sharpening a
pencil.10 Even after the steel pen rendered the quill obsolete, the
term persisted for any small, folding pocketknife.11 Schoolchildren
frequently carried penknives, as is attested by the knife’s frequent
appearance in elementary school readers of the nineteenth cen-
tury.12 Of course, the penknife was also often used for the many
other common purposes of knives.
Knives are important tools in many activities, such as hunting,
where they are used by sportsman to fillet a fish or skin an animal.
Many occupations continue to rely upon utility knives, such as
8. State v. Delgado, 692 P.2d 610, 614 (Or. 1984).
9. See SIMON MOORE, PENKNIVES AND OTHER FOLDING KNIVES 25–27 (1988); see also JOHN
MASON, MASON’S FIRST HOME & SCHOOL READER 75–76 (1874); CHARLES W. SANDERS, THE
SCHOOL READER: THIRD BOOK 58 (50th ed. 1846).
10. See MOORE, supra note 9, at 25.
11. Id. at 27.
12. See, e.g., RICHARD EDWARDS & J. RUSSELL WEBB, ANALYTICAL THIRD READER 161 (1867);
MASON, supra note 9, at 75–76; LEWIS B. MONROE, THE FOURTH READER 39–40 (1872); SAND-
ERS, supra note 9, at 58. As an anecdotal example of this, one of the authors has carried a
pocketknife every day of his life since third grade in 1955. He has never given a moment’s
thought to the legality of this common practice.
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roofers,13 electricians,14 and construction workers.15 Knives are
often part of combination tools that many Americans carry with
them, such as Swiss Army knives and Leatherman Multi-Tools. How-
ever, knives with even the most utilitarian purposes, such as box
cutters (with a one inch blade), can be used as weapons, as the
hijackers demonstrated on 9/11.16
B. Bayonets
A bayonet is designed to be mounted on the muzzle of a fire-
arm.17 Historically, some bayonets were just thrusting weapons with
a point and without a sharpened edge.18 Over the last century, bayo-
nets have become shorter, shrinking from the size of a short sword
to the size of a typical knife,19 and modern bayonets have sharp-
ened edges. Post-World War II designs evolved to recognize the
more frequent use of the bayonet as a tool—for example, for open-
ing ration cases or for use as a handheld weapon.20 As a result, the
13. See, e.g., BLACK & DECKER, THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO ROOFING & SIDING 58 (Brett
Martin et al. eds., 2004). See United States v. Irizarry, 509 F. Supp. 2d 198 (E.D.N.Y. 2007), for
details of a prosecution of a person that started when a police officer noticed that the defen-
dant was carrying a “Husky Sure-Grip Folding Knife,” which the defendant used at the
direction of his employer “for cutting sheet rock.” Id. at 199–203.
14. See, e.g., GREG FLETCHER, RESIDENTIAL CONSTRUCTION ACADEMY: HOUSE WIRING 67
(2004) (describing use of a knife by electricians for opening boxes, stripping insulation, and
as a substitute screwdriver for small screws).
15. See, e.g., MYRON R. FERGUSON, DRYWALL: PROFESSIONAL TECHNIQUES FOR GREAT RE-
SULTS 51 (Matthew Teague & Jessica DiDonato eds., 4th ed. 2012).
16. Box Cutters Found on Other September 11 Flights, CNN.COM (Sept. 24, 2001), http://
archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/23/inv.investigation.terrorism/.
17. Note that a rifle with a bayonet on it and without ammunition is functionally
equivalent to a Roman spear or javelin. Both are arms.
18. See J.H. Bill, Sabre and Bayonet Wounds; Arrow Wounds, in 2 THE INTERNATIONAL ENCY-
CLOPEDIA OF SURGERY 101, 101 (John Ashhurst, Jr., ed., 1882) (discussing the nature of
bayonet wounds and explaining that the edges of such wounds reflect the unsharpened na-
ture of the edges).
19. See STEPHEN BULL, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MILITARY TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION 36
(2004). Older bayonets, such as the World War I version designed for the Springfield 1903-
A3 rifle, were thinner, lighter, seventeen-inch versions of the Roman gladius sword and could
be used as a short sword. Military fashion in bayonets continued to evolve so that hundreds of
thousands of these bayonets were cut down to eight inches in length for use during World
War II on the M1 Garand rifle. See MARTIN J. BRAYLEY, BAYONETS: AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY
228-35, 249 (2004); ANTHONY CARTER, THE BAYONET: A HISTORY OF KNIFE AND SWORD BAYO-
NETS 1850–1970, at 115, 121 (1974).
20. See, e.g., JOHN BURGESS, THE WAR COMES TO ME: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHIC HISTORY OF
WORLD WAR II 45 (2007) (use of bayonet to open C-rations); HONDON B. HARGROVE, BUFFALO
SOLDIERS IN ITALY: BLACK AMERICANS IN WORLD WAR II 136 (1985) (concerning use of bayo-
nets and knifes as handheld weapons in combat).
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blade design became shorter, wider, and thicker, playing mul-
tifaceted roles for the late-twentieth-century soldier.21
Although anything with a blade can be used as an offensive or
defensive arm, World War II saw the introduction of the M4 bayo-
net, which was specifically designed to be useful as a handheld
weapon.22 In the post-Cold War era, bayonets were designed to
serve not only as fighting knives but also as wire cutters, box cutters,
or improvised pry bars.23
U.S. M9 BAYONET24
C. Swords
A sword is “[a] long-bladed weapon having a handle and some-
times a hilt and designed to stab, cut or slash.”25 There is no precise
distinction between a short sword and a long knife (such as a long
bayonet). Indeed, the long, sharpened-edged bayonets of the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were called “sword bayo-
nets.”26 An 1881 dictionary observed a change in social customs: a
sword is “a blade of steel, having one or two edges, set in a hilt, and
used with a motion of the whole arm. . . . In the [eighteenth] cen-
tury every gentleman wore a sword; now the use of the weapon is
almost confined to purposes of war.”27
A person can look at a pocketknife, then look at a medieval
broad sword with a forty-eight-inch blade, and readily identify
which is the “knife” and which is the “sword.” However, for interme-
diate blade length, the distinction is not so clear. What about a
21. See BULL, supra note 19, at 36 (discussing changing nature of the bayonet post-World
War II).
22. See BRAYLEY, supra note 19, at 232; CARTER, supra note 19, at 121.
23. See BRAYLEY, supra note 19, at 249; BULL, supra note 19, at 36; FRED J. PUSHIES, WEAP-
ONS OF DELTA FORCE 64 (2002).
24. From author Cramer’s personal collection.
25. Sword, WIKTIONARY, http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/sword (last updated July 11,
2013, 12:22 PM).
26. See B.E. Sargeaunt, The History of the Bayonet, 44 J. MILITARY SERVICE INST. U.S. 251,
255–56 (1909).
27. THOMAS WILHELM, A MILITARY DICTIONARY AND GAZETTEER 565 (rev. ed. 1881).
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fixed blade knife with a fourteen-inch blade or an eighteen-inch
machete?
As a Second Amendment issue, the knife/sword distinction is not
particularly important. If the Second Amendment protects one, it
protects the other.28 This Article concentrates on knives, but most
of the analysis applies equally to swords.
D. Folding Knives
Many state and local regulations distinguish between fixed blade
knives and folding knives,29 possibly because of the misguided as-
sumption that a fixed blade knife is a weapon whereas a folding
knife is just a tool. Of course, many utility knives, such as those used
for linoleum installation and wood veneering, are fixed blade, as
are many sportsmen’s knives and virtually all kitchen cutlery.30
Some folding knife laws make further distinction between knives
that lock open and those that do not; some statutes put folding
knives that lock in the same category as fixed blade knives.31 Legisla-
tors may think that a locking, folding knife can be used as a
weapon, whereas a folding knife that does not lock is a tool. The
reason for this view is simplistic: a locking knife will not close on
your hand when it meets resistance in a fight. While this is true, a
locking knife also will not close on your hand when it meets resis-
tance when used as a tool. The lock prevents the blade from closing
on your fingers; this is equally important when roofing a house and
when fighting for your life. The distinction between folding knives
that lock and those that do not is therefore not a sound basis upon
which to make distinctions of what is a weapon and what is a tool.
Furthermore, most folding knives possess the very useful feature
that they can be opened with one hand, which is particularly advan-
tageous when the other hand is otherwise occupied. The traditional
28. Just as handguns and long guns are both Second Amendment arms.
29. E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6301(2) (2012) (prohibiting concealed carry of “a dagger
. . . dangerous knife, straight-edged razor, [or] stiletto,” but exempting “an ordinary pocket
knife with no blade more than four inches in length”).
30. See, e.g., MIKE BURTON, VENEERING: A FOUNDATION COURSE 28 (rev. ed. 2006).
31. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 171b (West 2013) (locking folding knives and fixed
blade knives where blade exceeds four inches prohibited in government buildings), and id.
§ 626.10(a) (fixed blade knives where the blade exceeds two and one half inches and locking
folding knives, regardless of blade length, prohibited on primary and secondary school
grounds), with id. § 626.10(b) (locking folding knives allowed on college campuses regard-
less of length, while fixed blade knives longer than two and one half inches prohibited on
college campuses).
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tall ships motto, “[o]ne hand for yourself and one for the ship,”32
presents an obvious application for such a knife. Similarly, a
rancher holding an animal’s lead with one hand can use the other
to open a knife and free the beast from an entanglement. This fea-
ture shows that folding knives, whether locking or not, can as easily
be viewed as tools as they can be viewed as weapons.
In addition to distinctions between folding and fixed blade
knives, precisely how the knife opens makes a great deal of differ-
ence in many state laws. For example, if the blade is opened by
inserting a thumb into a small indentation, hole, or post near the
top of the blade and pushing, then it is legally unrestricted in al-
most all jurisdictions.33 If, after the thumb has begun pushing on
the indentation to open the blade, a spring helps finish the job,
then the knife is called an “assisted opening” (AO) knife.34 Popular
models of AO knives include the Kershaw Leek, Benchmade Tor-
rent, and Buck Rush.35 These knives are legally unrestricted under
federal law and most state laws.
Suppose instead that the knife has a button in the handle, and
when the button is pushed, a spring then pushes the blade open
automatically. Then, the knife is called a “switchblade,” which is
one type of “automatic knife.”36 Under federal law and a minority of
state laws, automatic knives face far greater restrictions.37
E. Automatic and Gravity Knives
An automatic knife is biased towards opening via a spring; some
type of latch or lock must keep the blade retained in the handle
until needed. For example, when the switchblade knife is folded,
the internal spring is always pressuring the blade towards opening.
The blade is restrained by a latch or lock. When the user presses a
button, the latch or lock is released. The blade automatically
springs open and typically locks in the open position.
32. THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF PROVERBS 146 (Jennifer Speake & John Simpson eds.,
5th ed. 2008).
33. See infra notes 40–41, 50–52 and accompanying text.
34. See Actuating Opening System for Folding Knife, U.S. Patent No. 8,359,753 (filed
Jan. 30, 2008).
35. See, e.g., Kershaw Assisted Openers & SpeedSafe Knives, KERSHAW KNIVES DIRECT, http://
www.kershawknivesdirect.com (follow “Assisted Openers” hyperlink under “Categories”) (last
visited Aug. 20, 2013).
36. See Commonwealth v. Lawson, 977 A.2d 583, 583 n.2 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009) (explain-
ing that automatic knives are forms of switchblades).
37. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1241(b) (2006); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 908 (West 2013);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 134–52 (2011).
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A second automatic knife is the “out the front” knife (OTF). An
OTF is not a folding knife.38 When the button is pushed, the blade
is pushed out the front of the handle by the spring. A third auto-
matic knife is the gravity, or inertia, knife. This knife has no spring;
the weighting of the blade and the absence of a bias towards closure
are such that, as soon as a lock is released, gravity (if the tip of the
knife blade is facing down) or a modest amount of centrifugal force
will cause the blade to move into the open position.39 Then, the
blade must be manually locked into the open position or else it will
slide back into the handle as soon as any force is applied (e.g., dur-
ing cutting or thrusting).
Thus, there are three types of knives that are particularly easy to
open with one hand: switchblade, out the front, and gravity. Of
these, the first two are properly called “automatic knives.” However,
poorly written statutes create confusion about the definitions. The
1958 Federal Switchblade Act (FSA) limits the importability and in-
terstate commerce of “switchblades.”40 Many state and local laws
copy the federal definition.41 Unfortunately, the federal definition
of “switchblade” includes out the front knives, gravity knives, and
real switchblades.42
Automatic knives were first produced in the 1700s,43 with the ear-
liest custom made for wealthy customers.44 By the mid-nineteenth
century, factory production of automatic knives made them afforda-
ble for ordinary consumers.45 During World War II, American
paratroopers were issued switchblade knives “in case they [became]
injured during a jump and needed to extricate themselves from
38. See JERRY AHERN, ARMED FOR PERSONAL DEFENSE 77–78 (2010) (explaining how an
“out the front” knife works).
39. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.00(5) (2013). Gravity knives can be either out-the-front or
side-openers. See RICHARD V. LANGSTON, THE COLLECTOR’S GUIDE TO SWITCHBLADE KNIVES 30
(2001).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 1242 (1958). Another statute prohibits possession of switchblade knives
in territories, overseas, or in “Indian country,” except for “any individual who has only one
arm” and who uses a blade less than three inches in length. Id. §§ 1243–44. Some state laws
prohibiting possession or carrying of switchblades also exempt any “one-armed person” from
these prohibitions. E.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.226a (West 2004).
41. E.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 134-52 (2011).
42. 15 U.S.C. § 1241(b) (1958). By interpretation, some state laws also cover butterfly
knives, which are discussed infra Part I.F.
43. See LANGSTON, supra note 39, at 5–6.
44. See id. (“For the most part, these old (going back to the 1700s) mostly European
(e.g., English, German, Spanish) knives were hand-produced custom pieces for the very rich,
not factory made.”).
45. See id. One of the first U.S. factories was the Waterville Cutlery Company, founded in
1843 in Waterbury, Connecticut. Id. at 7.
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their parachutes.”46 The switchblade enabled them to cut them-
selves loose with only one hand.47
In the 1950s, there was great public concern about juvenile delin-
quency.48 This concern was exacerbated by popular motion pictures
of the day, such as Rebel Without a Cause (1955), Crime in the Streets
(1956), 12 Angry Men (1957), and The Delinquents (1957), as well as
the very popular Broadway musical West Side Story. These stories in-
cluded violent scenes featuring the use of automatic knives by
fictional delinquents. Partly because of Hollywood’s sensationalism,
the public associated the switchblade with the juvenile delinquent,
who would flick the knife open at the commencement of a rumble
with a rival gang or some other criminal activity. This was an impor-
tant part the origin of the many statutes imposing special
restrictions on switchblades.49
Recently, there have been two attempts to blur the distinction
between automatic knives and non-automatic knives. In 2009, U.S.
Customs and Border Protection issued a new regulatory interpreta-
tion of the Federal Switchblade Act that would treat most one-hand
opening folding knives as automatics.50 This new interpretation
contradicted decades of previous Customs interpretation of the fed-
eral switchblade statute and would have covered the non-automatic,
assisted opening knives, which have an indentation, hole, or stud to
assist opening as opposed to a button that activates a spring.51 The
proposed new interpretation caused such an uproar that Congress
46. United States v. Irizarry, 509 F. Supp. 2d 198, 204 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
47. Id.
48. For a general analysis of the interaction between concerns about mass media and its
perceived effects on juvenile delinquency in the 1950s, see JAMES GILBERT, A CYCLE OF OUT-
RAGE: AMERICA’S REACTION TO THE JUVENILE DELINQUENT IN THE 1950S (1986), and FRANKIE Y.
BAILEY & DONNA C. HALE, POPULAR CULTURE, CRIME, AND JUSTICE (1998). For a differing
point of view emphasizing a failure to understand teenage culture, see David Matza &
Gresham M. Sykes, Juvenile Deliquency and Subterranean Values, 26 AM. SOC. REV. 712 (1961).
49. See GILBERT, supra note 48, at 160 (stating that switchblade laws were passed as a
result of concerns over juvenile delinquency); THOMAS DOHERTY, TEENAGERS AND TEENPICS:
JUVENILIZATION OF AMERICAN MOVIES 40 (rev. ed. 2002) (discussing the media focus on juve-
nile delinquency and switchblades).
50. See U.S. Customs & Border Prot., Proposed Revocation of Ruling Letters and Revocation of
Treatment Relating to the Admissibility of Certain Knives with Spring-Assisted Opening Mechanisms,
CUSTOMS BULL. & DECISIONS, May 22, 2009, at 5.
51. See id. A federal switchblade is a knife which “opens automatically . . . by hand pres-
sure applied to a button or other device in the handle of the knife,” or where gravity or
inertia allows the blade to slide out of the handle. See 15 U.S.C. § 1241(b) (2006). New York
State law refers to “centrifugal force” (not inertia) in the state definition. N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 265.00(5) (2013). Both statutes are attempting to describe the same kind of knife.
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quickly revised the federal statute to make it clear that non-auto-
matic folding knives with a bias towards closure are not within the
federal definition of “switchblade.”52
As detailed below, Manhattan District Attorney Cyrus Vance, Jr.
has been doing something similar with the New York State switch-
blade and gravity knife statute.53 He has been bringing criminal
cases against persons who possess, carry, or sell non-automatic fold-
ing knives with a bias towards closure and charging them with
violation of the state’s ban on gravity knives and switchblades.
These prosecutions are abusive. Unfortunately, many persons or
businesses charged under the statute have lacked the resources to
fight the charges by bringing in expert witnesses who can explain
knife mechanics to the court.54 Thus, there have been many out-of-
court settlements with retailers, from whom Vance’s office has
pocketed significant amounts of money.55
Partly because of Vance’s prosecutions, some state legislatures
are proactively preventing similar abuses. These legislatures have
repealed their decades-old ban on switchblades, gravity knives, or
other banned knives such as dirks, daggers, and stilettos.56 Other
legislatures have enacted preemption statutes that eliminate local
52. See Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-
83, sec. 562, § 4, 123 Stat. 2142, 2183 (2009) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1244 (2012)).
53. See Press Release, N.Y. Cnty. Dist. Attorney’s Office, District Attorney Vance An-
nounces Major Investigation of Illegal Knives in New York (June 6, 2010), available at http://
www.kniferights.org/VancePressRelease062010.pdf; Knife Rights Contests DA’s Claims, Tactics in
Knife Retailer Shakedown, KNIFE RIGHTS, http://www.kniferights.org/index.php?option=com_
content&task=view&id=113&Itemid=1 (last visited Oct. 3, 2013). Cf. United States v. Irizarry,
509 F. Supp. 2d 198, 209 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (case arising from a police search of a workman
who was seen carrying a Husky Sure-Grip Folding Knife).
54. Manhattan District Attorney Shakes Down Honest Knife Retailers, KNIFE RIGHTS, http://
www.kniferights.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=113&Itemid=1 (last vis-
ited Oct. 3, 2013). For a civil rights lawsuit based on the Vance prosecutions, see Complaint,
Knife Rights, Inc. v. Vance, 2011 WL 7567075 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 11 CV 3918). However,
Vance has not exclusively targeted the legally defenseless. See Press Release, N.Y. Cnty. Dist.
Attorney’s Office, supra note 53.
55. Manhattan District Attorney Shakes Down Honest Knife Retailers, supra note 54.
56. See H.R. 1665, 2010 Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2010) (removing all references to
knives in section 159:16 of the New Hampshire Code, which prohibits the carrying of certain
weapons); S. 489, 96th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2012) (repealing switchblade ban in
section 571.020 of the Missouri Code); H.R. 2347, 62nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2012) (nar-
rowing and clarifying definition of “spring-blade” knives in section 9.41.250 of the
Washington Code); H.R. 2033, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2013) (preempting local ordi-
nances, plus repealing ban on switchblades, dirks, daggers, and stilettos); H.R. 33, 28th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Alaska 2013) (preempting local ordinances; repealing ban on switchblades); H.R.
1563, 118th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2013) (repealing ban on switchblades); H.R.
1862, 83d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2013) (repealing ban on switchblades).
Narrowly defined, a stiletto has “one slender bayonet-type blade with the point area back
to about one-third of the blade” and is partially or fully double-edged. Historically, it was
particularly popular in Italy, France, Spain, and Germany. LANGSTON, supra note 39, at 26.
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bans on switchblades and other local knife ordinances that are
more restrictive than state law.57
F. Butterfly Knives
Butterfly knives, also known as balisongs, are sometimes named
explicitly in state or local knife laws and are occasionally considered
to fall within a state or local definition of “switchblade.”58 A butter-
fly knife consists of two handle sections that, when the knife is
closed, completely cover the blade.
A BUTTERFLY KNIFE OPEN AND CLOSED59
By holding one handle and rotating the other handle away from
the closed position, it is possible to open the knife and bring the
two handles together. The handles may then lock together, al-
though not all do. In some states, the lock is the difference between
57. See S. 1015, 108th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2013); supra note 54.
58. See, e.g., State v. Riddall, 811 P.2d 576, 578–80 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that a
balisong is a switchblade as defined by New Mexico statute); People v. Quattrone, 260 Cal.
Rptr. 44, 44 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that a balisong was a switchblade under California
statute). But see, e.g., Taylor v. McManus, 661 F. Supp. 11, 14 (E.D. Tenn. 1986) (ruling that
balisongs are not switchblades under federal law); State v. Strange, 785 P.2d 563, 566 (Alaska
Ct. App. 1990) (ruling that balisongs are neither switchblades nor gravity knives); People v.
Mott, 522 N.Y.S.2d 429, 430 (N.Y. Cnty. Ct. 1987) (ruling that balisongs are not gravity
knives).
59. Photograph supplied by Knife Rights, Inc.
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a legal and an illegal knife.60 Many experts believe that a butterfly
knife is the strongest and safest folding knife because the blade can-
not fold closed inadvertently on the operator so long as the
operator has a firm grasp on the handles.61 In contrast, a lock-blade
folding knife can experience a lock failure, although this is rare for
well-constructed knives.
An experienced operator can also flip the butterfly handle into
the open position using only one hand. Like the switchblade, the
butterfly knife’s use in movies has given it an undeserved reputa-
tion as a criminal’s weapon.62 As with the switchblade, opening one
is visually interesting and frightening to some persons unfamiliar
with knives, creating a belief that it is an extremely dangerous
weapon necessitating special legislative attention.63
All the knives described above are primarily tools, although they
can also be used as weapons. Conversely, knives may be designed as
weapons but used primarily as tools. A judge or juror’s perception
of the purpose of a knife may be quite different from the owner’s or
the designer’s perception. The knives discussed below, however, are
ones that some governments  have historically believed to need spe-
cial regulation or prohibition.
G. Bowie Knives and Arkansas Toothpicks
America’s first period of knife control was in 1837–1840, when
the nation experienced a panic over the Bowie knife and the Arkan-
sas Toothpick.64 This Section discusses the knives’ historical use,
while the strange legal history of Bowie knives and Arkansas Tooth-
picks in the nineteenth century is detailed below in Part III.
60. See, e.g., Taylor, 661 F. Supp. at 14–15 (holding that the required step of locking the
knife into an open position takes it out of the category of automatic knives).
61. See Paradox, COLD STEEL, http://www.coldsteel.com/Product/24P/PARADOX.aspx
(last visited Aug. 20, 2013) (“They are designed to rotate 180 degrees around the blade’s
unique split tang and use strong opposing spring tension to lock the blade open or hold it
firmly closed. Don’t worry about it taking two hands to get it into action, since once it’s
opened it will never close inadvertently.”).
62. For a representative list of films in which balisongs are used, see Balisongs in the
Movies, BALISONGCOLLECTOR.COM, http://www.balisongcollector.com/movies.html (last vis-
ited Aug. 20, 2013).
63. See Michael Burch, Butterfly Knives Take Wing, 28 KNIVES 26, 26, 30 (2008).
64. See CLAYTON E. CRAMER, CONCEALED WEAPON LAWS OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC 85–96,
105–12 (1999) (discussing the tragedies and breathless newspaper coverage associated with
this panic).
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The Bowie knife became famous when used by Colonel Jim
Bowie at the “Sandbar Fight” by the lower Mississippi River on Sep-
tember 19, 1827.65 Rezin Bowie, Colonel Jim’s brother, was the
actual maker of the knife. He described his creation thusly: “The
length of the knife was nine and a quarter inches, its width one and
a half inches, single-edged, and blade not curved.”66 According to
Rezin, the knife was designed for bear hunting.67 Based on the
known details of Rezin’s knife, absolutely nothing about it was
novel.  Its fame soon made this style of knife in high demand and
increasingly popular.68
Yet, the knife gained such popularity that many people use
“Bowie knife” to describe knives that have curved blades or blades
much longer than nine inches.69 Today, a common description of
the “Bowie knife” is a large fixed blade (almost always much longer
than Rezin’s nine inch long blade), sharpened on one edge (per
Rezin’s original model), with a relatively thick spine and a clip
point.70 This modern usage does not describe Rezin Bowie’s origi-
nal knife. Ironically, it also does not describe the custom knives that
professional cutlers later produced for Rezin or Jim Bowie.71
The problem of the Bowie knife’s notoriety as a fighting knife
extends back to the first weeks after the Sandbar Fight. Newspaper
and magazine reports of the event were often highly inaccurate.72
The term “Bowie knife” entered the American vocabulary from
these reports and then crossed the Atlantic. American and English
manufacturers began using the term for a wide variety of large
knives. Some knives had clip points, and others did not; some were
straight, and others were curved; some were single-edged, and
others were double-edged; some had crossguards, and others did
not. There was also great variance in length. The only thing these
knives had in common was that they were big, and all of them were
considered particularly suitable for self-defense and  hunting.73 His-
torian Norm Flayderman, an expert in Bowie and other knives,
65. See RAYMOND W. THORP, BOWIE KNIFE 6–8 (1948); NORM FLAYDERMAN, THE BOWIE
KNIFE: UNSHEATHING AN AMERICAN LEGEND 285–89 (2004).
66. R.P. Bowie, Letter to the Editor, PLANTER’S ADVOCATE, Aug. 24, 1838, reprinted in MAR-
RYAT, 1 A DIARY IN AMERICA, WITH REMARKS ON ITS INSTITUTIONS 291 (1839).
67. Id.
68. See FLAYDERMAN, supra note 65, at 491–92.
69. See Sears v. State, 33 Ala. 347, 348 (1859); J.R. EDMONDSON, THE ALAMO STORY: FROM
EARLY HISTORY TO CURRENT CONFLICTS 122–23 (2000).
70. See Jim Woods, How to Pick a Perfect Knife, POPULAR MECHANICS, Aug. 1982, at 78,
78–80.
71. See FLAYDERMAN, supra note 65, at 491–92.
72. See id. at 289–91.
73. See id. at 490–92.
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both antique and modern, concludes that “there is no one specific
knife that can be exactingly described as a Bowie knife.”74
Today, several states outlaw carrying a “Bowie knife” without de-
fining the term.75 Thus, today’s citizens who are subject to Bowie
knife laws have no way of knowing whether they are forbidden to
carry a straight knife that closely matches Rezin Bowie’s design or
the curved knives that are commonly called “Bowie knives.” The
state’s definition may even include a knife that is neither, but has
the words “Bowie Knife” written on it.76 The chilling effect of this
vagueness is obvious.
The Arkansas Toothpick’s history is interwoven with that of the
Bowie knife. There are some Mississippi tax receipts from the ante-
bellum era, as well as some other writings, which expressly
distinguish an “Arkansas Toothpick” from a “Bowie knife.”77 Nar-
rowly defined, Arkansas Toothpicks have triangular blades up to
eighteen inches long, sharpened on both edges.78
ARKANSAS TOOTHPICK79
However, Flayderman concludes that “Arkansas Toothpick” was,
in its predominant usage, simply another marketing term for
“Bowie knife.”80
II. CRIMINOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS: IS A KNIFE MORE
DANGEROUS THAN A GUN?
Under the Supreme Court’s decision in District of Columbia v. Hel-
ler, handguns, as a general class, are protected by the Second
74. Id. at 490.
75. See ALA. CODE § 13A-11-50 (LexisNexis 2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-127.1 (2011);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 2001-A (2012); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-37-1 (2012); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-269 (2011); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1272 (2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-47-42 (2012);
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.01 (West 2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308 (2009).
76. See generally FLAYDERMAN, supra note 65, at 490.
77. Id. at 265–66.
78. See WILLIAM FOSTER-HARRIS, THE LOOK OF THE OLD WEST 120–22 (2007).
79. Drawing by Rhonda L. Thorne Cramer.
80. FLAYDERMAN, supra note 65, at 265–74.
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Amendment.81 This is so notwithstanding the frequent use of hand-
guns in violent crimes, including homicide. Heller acknowledged
that, even though handgun misuse represents a major public safety
problem, “[T]he enshrinement of constitutional rights necessarily
takes certain policy choices off the table.”82 If handguns may not be
prohibited, in spite of the clear public safety concerns, then a cate-
gory of arm that is less dangerous clearly may not be prohibited,
either.
Are knives more dangerous than guns? Quite the opposite. In
2010, “[k]nives or cutting instruments” were used in 13.1 percent of
U.S. murders, behind firearms (67.5 percent) and handguns specif-
ically (46.2 percent), but ahead of blunt objects (4.2 percent),
shotguns (2.9 percent), and rifles (2.8 percent).83 The thirteen per-
cent includes all knives, including steak knives, butcher knives,
linoleum knives, and other “cutting instruments,” such as screwdriv-
ers (sharpened and otherwise), straight razors, and other
instruments made into weapons by the inventiveness of criminals.84
Robberies for which the FBI has detailed information are over-
whelmingly committed with firearms (47.9 crimes/100,000 people),
not knives or other cutting instruments (9.1/100,000).85 Knives and
other cutting instruments are actually in last place in the FBI statis-
tics for robbery, even behind “other weapon.”86 Similarly, in the
category of aggravated assault, sharp objects are in last place for
weapon type (47.9/100,000 people), behind firearms (51.8), per-
sonal weapons (69.0), and other weapons (83.3). 87
81. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628–29 (2008) (“The handgun ban
amounts to a prohibition of an entire class of ‘arms’ that is overwhelmingly chosen by Ameri-
can society for that lawful purpose. The prohibition extends, moreover, to the home, where
the need for defense of self, family, and property is most acute. Under any of the standards of
scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated constitutional rights, banning from the home
‘the most preferred firearm in the nation to “keep” and use for protection of one’s home and
family,’ would fail constitutional muster.”) (quoting Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d
370, 400 (D.C. Cir. 2007)).
82. Id. at 2822 (“We are aware of the problem of handgun violence in this country, and
we take seriously the concerns raised by the many amici who believe that prohibition of hand-
gun ownership is a solution.”)
83. See Crime in the United States 2010, Expanded Homicide Data Table 11, FBI, http://www.
fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.-2010/tables/10shrtbl11
.xls (last visited Aug. 20, 2013). For some homicides, the type of firearm is unknown, which is
why the “firearm” figure is higher than the figures for handguns, rifles, and shotguns added
together.
84. See id.
85. Crime in the United States 2010, Table 19, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/
crime-in-the-u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.-2010/tables/10tbl19.xls (last visited Aug. 20, 2013).
86. Id.
87. Id.
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Unsurprisingly, data show that gunshots are more lethal than
knife wounds. Harwell Wilson and Roger Sherman’s 1960 study of
hospital admissions for abdominal wounds found that abdominal
stabbing cases ended in death 3.1 percent of the time, while 9.8
percent of abdominal gunshot wounds were lethal.88 An examina-
tion of 165 family and intimate assaults (FIA) in Atlanta, Georgia in
1984 found similar results. Firearms-associated FIAs were three
times more likely to result in death than “FIAs involving knives or
other cutting instruments.”89
Another study examined all penetrating traumas (“firearm or
stabbing injury”) in New Mexico that “presented to either the state
Level-1 trauma center or the state medical examiner” from 1978 to
1993.90 This study found that, although nonfatal injury rates were
similar for firearms and stabbing (34.3 per 100,000 persons per year
for firearms, 35.1 per 100,000 persons per year for stabbing), fire-
arm fatality rates were much higher than for knives: 21.9 vs. 2.7.91 In
other words, thirty-nine percent of firearm penetrating traumas
were fatal, compared to 7.1 percent of knife penetrating traumas.
Thus, firearm injuries were 5.5 times more likely to result in death
than were knife injuries. Not all of the penetrating traumas in New
Mexico were criminal attacks. Fifty-five percent of the penetrating
deaths were suicides, and four percent of the penetrating deaths
were accidents.  There was insufficient information to determine
the breakdown of weapon type by category.92
Knives in general are far less regulated than firearms. There are
no mandatory background checks, no prohibitions on interstate
sales (except for switchblades),93 and no serial number require-
ments. The least expensive knives are considerably less expensive
than the cheapest firearms.94 Only about half of American homes
88. Harwell Wilson & Roger Sherman, Civilian Penetrating Wounds of the Abdomen, 153
ANNALS SURGERY 639, 640 (1961).
89. Linda E. Saltzman et al., Weapon Involvement and Injury Outcomes in Family and Intimate
Assaults, 267 JAMA 3043, 3043 (1992).
90. Cameron Crandall et al., Guns and Knives in New Mexico: Patterns of Penetrating
Trauma, 1978–1993, 4 ACAD. EMERGENCY MED. 263, 263 (1997).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 264. As for the remaining firearm deaths classified as “homicide,” about six to
twelve percent of them were probably justifiable homicides committed with firearms by per-
sons who were not law enforcement officers. This is calculated by multiplying the 7.1–12.9
percent of civilian legal defensive homicides by the percentage of those homicides commit-
ted with firearms. KLECK, supra note 4, at 114, 148. It is unknown whether a similar percent of
the knife homicides were justifiable.
93. See 15 U.S.C. § 1242 (2006).
94. Searching Amazon.com on September 29, 2012 found more than 298 matches for
“combat knife” under 25 dollars, and 114 matches under 10 dollars. By comparison, even the
cheapest single-shot .22 rifles (which would only be used by very stupid criminals) at the
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have a gun, but almost every home has several knives, including
tools, steak knives, and butcher knives. At the same time, these eas-
ily obtained arms are used far less often than firearms for murder,
robbery, and aggravated assault. Thus, knives are far less dangerous
than guns. Any public safety justification for knife regulation is nec-
essarily less persuasive than the public safety justification for
firearms regulation.
III. BOWIE KNIVES AND THE NINETEENTH CENTURY CASES
During the nineteenth century, Bowie knives were commonly
present in many areas of the United States. Contemporary sources
leave no question that Bowie knives, Arkansas Toothpicks, and simi-
lar knives were a common part of American life until well after the
Civil War—and not just for decoration, hunting, or slicing tough
cuts of meat.95 “[F]or those crossing the plains,” such knives were “a
necessity.”96 An account of Gold Rush California describes how mas-
querade balls in California would generally have “No weapons
admitted” signs at the entrance.97 An observer tells us that:
[I]t was worth while to go, if only to watch the company arrive,
and to see the practical enforcement of the weapon clause. . . .
Most men draw a pistol from behind their back, and very often
a knife along with it; some carried their bowie-knife down the
back of the neck, or in their breast; demure, pious looking
men . . . lifted up the bottom of their waistcoast, and revealed
the butt of a revolver; others, after having already disgorged a
Cabela’s website on the same date was $99.99. The cheapest repeating .22 rifle, the Mossberg
702 Plinkster, was $139.99.
95. A few representative articles of the period illustrating the widespread violence associ-
ated with edged weapons (along with many other deadly weapons) include: Scenes at New
Orleans, THE LIVING AGE, Oct.–Dec. 1852, at 528; Editor’s Easy Chair, 11 HARPER’S NEW
MONTHLY MAG. 411, 411–12 (1855); MARRYAT, supra note 66, at 106–10; Colonel Bowie and his
Knife, TEMPLE BAR, July 1861, at 120; GEORGE COMBE, 2 ON THE UNITED STATES OF NORTH
AMERICA 93–95 (1841); AMERICAN ANTI-SLAVERY SOCIETY, AMERICAN SLAVERY AS IT IS 202–05
(1839). Among the well-known authors whose writings about America during this period
included mention of Bowie knives were: CHARLES DICKENS, AMERICAN NOTES (1842) and
GREAT EXPECTATIONS (1861); OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, AUTOCRAT OF THE BREAKFAST TABLE
(1857) (Americans are the “Romans of the modern world . . . our army sword is the short,
stiff pointed gladius of the Romans; and the American bowie knife is the same tool, modified
to meet the daily want of civil society.”); JULES VERNE, FROM THE EARTH TO THE MOON (1st
English ed. 1873) (1865); Bret Harte, The Outcasts of Poker Flat, OVERLAND MONTHLY, Jan.
1869; MARK TWAIN, ROUGHING IT (1872); all cited in FLAYDERMAN, supra note 65, at 72–73.
96. FLAYDERMAN, supra note 65, at 88.
97. J.D. Borthwick, Three Years in California, 2 HUTCHINGS’ ILLUSTRATED CAL. MAG. 169,
171 (1857).
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pistol, pulled up the leg of their trousers, and abstracted a
huge bowie-knife from their boot; and there were men, terri-
ble fellows, no doubt, but who were more likely to frighten
themselves than any one else, who produced a revolver from
each trouser pocket, and a bowie knife from their belt. If any
man declared that he had no weapon, the statement was so
incredible that he had to submit to be searched.98
During the 1850s, because of conflict in the Territory of Kansas
between free soil and pro-slavery settlers, anti-slavery groups in New
England sent arms to the free soilers, including rifles, revolvers, and
Bowie knives.99
An important reason that the Bowie knife was typically possessed
for self-defense was that it was, in some respects, superior to fire-
arms. The black gunpowder used in the early and mid-nineteenth
century was vulnerable to atmospheric moisture. At close quarters,
a single-shot firearm has obvious limitations for self-defense. The
widespread adoption of the metallic cartridge in the late 1850s, and
the Colt’s multi-shot revolvers in the 1840s, solved some of these
problems, though it was not until the mid-1860s that medium cali-
ber (.38 or larger) firearms with metallic cartridges became
common. Before then, the Bowie knife often had a better chance
than the handgun of stopping a criminal attacker; at least, a pru-
dent defender would often want to carry a Bowie as a back-up
arm.100
About a decade after the first appearance of the Bowie knife,
some southern states began passing laws against the knife. Alabama
imposed a one hundred dollar tax on the transfer of any Bowie
knife or Arkansas Toothpick101—the equivalent of at least $5,000 in
today’s money.102 In 1837, Tennessee prohibited carrying such
98. Id.
99. See FLAYDERMAN, supra note 65, at 106 (citing WILLIAM ELSEY CONNELLEY, THE LIFE OF
PRESTON B. PLUMB, 1837–1891 (1913)) (three-term U.S. Senator from Kansas recalls receiv-
ing a shipment including 250 Bowie knives); David B. Kopel, Beecher’s Bibles, in 1 GUNS IN
AMERICAN SOCIETY: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HISTORY, POLITICS, CULTURE, AND THE LAW 58 (Gregg
Lee Carter ed., 2d ed. 2012).
100. See FLAYDERMAN, supra note 65, at 485–87.
101. An Act To Suppress the Use of Bowie Knives, no. 11, 1837 Ala. Acts Called Sess. 7
(1837).
102. The price of gold in 1840 was fixed at $20.67 per ounce. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES 863 (1942). As of June 2, 2013, gold price was $1,387 per ounce, a 6,710
percent increase. See GOLDPRICE, http://goldprice.org/. While gold price change alone is not
a completely effective measure of price inflation because of changes in production efficien-
cies, it is at least a good starting point for a proxy.
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knives.103 An attempt to add pistols to the 1838 Tennessee bill
failed.104
This attempt to regulate knives produced several nineteenth cen-
tury cases involving Bowie knives.105 These cases mostly followed the
Tennessee Supreme Court’s 1840 case, Aymette v. State,106 which was
wrong on its facts and later specifically repudiated by Heller.107 The
Tennessee Supreme Court in Aymette upheld the ban on the con-
cealed carry of Bowie knives and Arkansas Toothpicks, holding that
the Tennessee Constitution’s guarantee of a right to keep and bear
arms for the common defense “does not mean for private defence,
but being armed, they may as a body, rise up to defend their just
rights, and compel their rulers to respect the laws.”108 According to
Aymette, the Bowie knife was not suitable for “civilized warfare” but
was instead favored by “assassins” and “ruffians.”109 Significantly, the
103. An Act to Suppress the Sale and Use of Bowie Knives and Arkansas Tooth Picks in
this State, ch. 137, 22 Tenn. Gen. Assemb. Acts 200 (1838).
The Bowie knife was also banned in Arkansas. The ban was repealed on February 5, 1973
in “emergency” legislation, which declared that knife manufacturing “has brought much
favorable publicity to this State, that the prohibitions placed upon the sale of Bowie knives
are unneeded . . . [and] that that immediate removal of such restrictions would have a
favorable impact upon the economy of this state. Therefore an emergency is hereby declared
to exist, and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and
safety . . . .” FLAYDERMAN, supra note 65, at 280.
104. Tennessee Legislature, DAILY REPUBLICAN BANNER (Nashville), Jan. 13, 1838, at 2.
105. One of the first problems encountered by the anti-Bowie laws was vagueness. In
Haynes v. State, the Tennessee Supreme Court dealt with the complaint that the statute was
vague and overbroad. 24 Tenn. (5 Hum.) 120, 122 (1844). The Tennessee statute applied to
“any Bowie knife or knives, or Arkansas tooth picks, or any knife or weapon that shall in
form, shape or size resemble a Bowie knife or any Arkansas tooth pick . . . .” Ch. 137, 22
Tenn. Gen. Assemb. Acts 200.
The defendant, Stephen Haynes, was charged in Knox County with carrying “concealed
under his clothes, a knife in size resembling a bowie-knife.” At trial, the witnesses disagreed
about whether Haynes’s knife was a Bowie knife. Some said that it was too small and too slim
to be a Bowie knife and would properly be called a “Mexican pirate-knife.” The jury found
Haynes innocent of wearing a Bowie knife but guilty on a second charge “of wearing a knife
in size resembling a bowie-knife.” Haynes, 24 Tenn. (5 Hum.) at 120–21.
The Tennessee Supreme Court agreed that the legislature could not declare “war against
the name of the knife” alone. A strict application of the letter of the law might well result in
some injustices: “for a small pocket-knife, which is innocuous, may be made to resemble in
form and shape a bowie-knife or Arkansas tooth-pick” and would thus be illegal. The court
concluded that the law must be construed “within the spirit and meaning of the law” and
relied on the judge and jury to make this decision as a matter of fact. Haynes, 24 Tenn. (5
Hum.) at 122–23.
106. Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154 (1840).
107. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 613 (2008).
108. Aymette, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.), at 157–58 (1840).
109. See id. at 158–60. The entire decision in Aymette is guided by Tennessee’s narrow
arms provision: “[T]he words that are employed must completely remove that doubt. It is
declared that they may keep and bear arms for their common defence.” Id. at 158. The opinion
repeatedly ties the right solely to the “common defence.”
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Tennessee Constitution’s guarantee, unlike the Second Amend-
ment, contains the qualifying phrase, “for their common defence,”
which the U.S. Senate considered and rejected for the Second
Amendment.110
The other major nineteenth century Bowie knife precedent,
which is not part of the Aymette line, comes from Texas. In 1859, the
Texas Supreme Court, in Cockrum v. State, ruled that, under the
Texas Constitution’s right to arms and the Second Amendment,
“[t]he right to carry a bowie-knife for lawful defense is secured, and
must be admitted.”111 At the same time, the court upheld enhanced
punishment for manslaughter perpetrated with a Bowie knife.112
The court elaborated on the Bowie knife:
It is an exceeding destructive weapon. It is difficult to defend
against it, by any degree of bravery, or any amount of skill. The
gun or pistol may miss its aim, and when discharged, its dan-
gerous character is lost, or diminished at least. The sword may
be parried. With these weapons men fight for the sake of the
combat, to satisfy the laws of honor, not necessarily with the
intention to kill, or with a certainty of killing, when the inten-
tion exists. The bowie-knife differs from these in its device and
design; it is the instrument of almost certain death.113
A plausible explanation for this perception of the Bowie knife as
“the instrument of almost certain death” is that it made a bloody
mess of a person because of the size of its blade. This is especially
true when compared to a pen-knife or dagger, but even more so
when compared to a bullet (which had almost surgical, cosmetic
consequences during the low velocity, black powder era). Hence,
the Bowie Knife was a relatively gruesome weapon.114
Additionally, the judicial and legislative fear of Bowie knives may
have come from concerns about poor people or people of color. As
Aymette is the urtext for the “civilized warfare” interpretation of the right to keep and bear
arms, by which all persons have a right to own arms, but only arms which are useful for
militia purposes. For a sympathetic treatment of the nineteenth century’s “civilized warfare”
cases, see Michael P. O’Shea, Modeling the Second Amendment Right to Carry Arms (I): Judicial
Tradition and the Scope of “Bearing Arms” for Self-Defense, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 585, 642–50 (2012).
110. S. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 129 (1789).
111. Cockrum v. State, 24 Tex. 394, 402 (1859).
112. Id. at 403.
113. Id. at 402–03 (emphasis added).
114. Even modern high velocity bullets, while producing large hydrostatic expansions
within a person, produce exit wounds only two to three times the diameter of the entry
wound. See Martin L. Fackler, Wound Profiles, WOUND BALLISTICS REV., Fall 2001, at 25 (exam-
ining damage in living tissue measured in experiments at the Letterman Army Institute of
Research, Wound Ballistics Laboratory).
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the defendant’s attorney argued before the Texas Supreme Court
in Cockrum:
A bowie-knife or dagger, as defined in the code, is an ordinary
weapon, one of the cheapest character, accessible even to the
poorest citizen. A common butcher-knife, which costs not
more than half a dollar, comes within the description given of
a bowie-knife or dagger, being very frequently worn on the
person. To prohibit such a weapon, is substantially to take
away the right of bearing arms, from him who has not money
enough to buy a gun or a pistol.115
Some other state supreme court decisions picked up where
Aymette left off, holding that some knives are not militia arms. In
English v. State, the Texas Supreme Court apparently forgot the
Cockrum decision and justified a ban on “the carrying of pistols,
dirks [a short dagger], and certain other deadly weapons” by argu-
ing that these are not arms of the militia: “The terms dirks, daggers,
slungshots, sword-canes, brass-knuckles and bowie knives, belong to
no military vocabulary. Were a soldier on duty found with any of
these things about his person, he would be punished for an offense
against discipline.”116 English cites no authority for its claim with re-
spect to the military use of the knives of various sorts, and the claim
appears to be false.117 Similar to Aymette, English recognized that bay-
onets and swords, unlike the knives in question, were “arms”
protected by the Second Amendment.118
Similarly, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in State v.
Workman held that the arms protected by the Second Amendment:
must be held to refer to the weapons of warfare to be used by
the militia, such as swords, guns, rifles, and muskets—arms to
be used in defending the State and civil liberty—and not to
pistols, bowie-knives, brass knuckles, billies, and such other
weapons as are usually employed in brawls, street-fights, duels,
115. Cockrum, 24 Tex. at 395–96.
116. English v. State, 35 Tex. 473, 473, 477 (1872).
117. Id. at 477–78. For use of the bowie knife as a militia arm, see infra notes 124–28 and
accompanying text.
118. English, 35 Tex. at 476 (“The word ‘arms’ in the connection we find it in the consti-
tution of the United States, refers to the arms of a militiaman or soldier, and the word is used
in its military sense. The arms of the infantry soldier are the musket and bayonet; of cavalry
and dragoons, the sabre, holster pistols and carbine . . . .”)
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and affrays, and are only habitually carried by bullies, black-
guards, and desperadoes, to the terror of the community and
the injury of the State.119
Heller held that Aymette “erroneously, and contrary to virtually all
other authorities,” read the right to keep and bear arms as limited
to the threat to overthrow a tyrannical government.120 Heller repudi-
ated Aymette and its progeny, English and Workman. Moreover, even
if Heller had adopted Aymette’s rule that there is an individual right
to own all militia-suitable arms, the Bowie knife is a militia arm. It
may not have been standard equipment for the Tennessee militia in
1840, but there is plenty of evidence of its militia use in the rest of
the United States.
The Republic of Texas won its independence from Mexico at the
Battle of San Jacinto on April 21, 1836. At the decisive phase of the
battle, the 700 Texas volunteers were storming the Mexican breast-
works. The fighting was hand-to-hand. The Texans had broken
their rifles by using them as clubs against the standing army of the
Mexican dictator, Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna Perez de Lebron.
The Texans next fired their pistols, but had no time to reload. The
Texans, “then drawing forth their bowie-knives, literally cut their
way through dense masses of living flesh.”121 The Mexican army,
“unused to this mode of combat with huge Bowie-knives and the
buts [sic] of guns, precipitately gave way; and while the shouts of
Goliad and the Alamo rung in their ears, nearly one-half of the
Mexican army was laid asleep in . . . death.”122 In an eighteen-min-
ute battle, Texas became a nation.123
Bowie knives were most clearly militia arms during the Civil War:
The Mississippi Riflemen . . . [i]n addition to their rifle, . . .
carried a sheath-knife, known as the bowie-knife. . . . This is a
formidable weapon in a hand-to-hand fight, when wielded by
men expert in its use, as many were in the Southwestern States,
119. State v. Workman, 14 S.E. 9, 11 (W. Va. 1891).
120. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 613 (2008).
121. CHARLES EDWARDS LESTER, SAM HOUSTON AND HIS REPUBLIC 97 (1846), quoted in
FLAYDERMAN, supra note 65, at 59.
122. EDWARD STIFF, THE TEXAN EMIGRANT 324–25 (1840), quoted in FLAYDERMAN, supra
note 65, at 64. Goliad was the site of another battle, where Santa Anna had murdered 280
American prisoners.
123. See generally STEPHEN L. MOORE, EIGHTEEN MINUTES: THE BATTLE OF SAN JACINTO AND
THE TEXAS INDEPENDENCE CAMPAIGN (2003).
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where it was generally seen in murderous frays in the streets
and bar-rooms.124
Other Mississippi militiamen were “armed with the rifles, shot-guns,
and knives which they had brought from their homes.”125 As further
evidence of the prevalence of Bowie knives among Civil War
soldiers, below are contemporary drawings of crudely made daggers
and Bowie knives that were “in common use among the insurgent
troops from the Mississippi region.”126
127
While the then-Southwest (Mississippi, Louisiana, Arkansas, and
Texas) was the Bowie knife’s original territory, the knife was ubiqui-
tous on both sides of the Civil War, carried by soldiers from every
part of the nation.128  The claims of Aymette and Workman that knives
were not militia arms are clearly erroneous.
124. BENSON J. LOSSING, 1 PICTORIAL HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 479 n.2 (1866).
125. Id. at 541 n.2.
126. Id.
127. Id. Other accounts referencing soldiers carrying Bowie knives, without apparently
being in violation of military discipline, include COMTE DE PARIS, 1.3 HISTORY OF THE CIVIL
WAR IN AMERICA 271 (Louis F. Tasistro trans., 1875); JAMES R. GILMORE, PERSONAL RECOLLEC-
TIONS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND THE CIVIL WAR 110–11 (1899); D.M. KELSEY, DEEDS OF
DARING BY BOTH BLUE AND GRAY 300 (1883); WM. H. RUSSELL, THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA 175
(1861); SAMUEL M. SCHMUCKER, THE HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES: ITS
CAUSE, ORIGIN, PROGRESS AND CONCLUSION 987 (1865); SAMUEL M. SCHMUCKER, 1 A HISTORY
OF THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES; WITH A PRELIMINARY VIEW OF ITS CAUSES 188 (1863);
John G. Walker, Jackson’s Capture of Harper’s Ferry, in 2 BATTLES AND LEADERS OF THE CIVIL WAR
604, 607 (Robert Underwood Johnson & Clarence Clough Buel eds., 1887).
128. See FLAYDERMAN, supra note 65, at 125–68.
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IV. KNIVES AS CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED ARMS
This Part explains how knives are protected by the Second
Amendment. Section A points out that the Second Amendment is
for “arms,” not just for “firearms.” Being a militia-suitable arm is
sufficient, but not necessary, for the Second Amendment to apply,
and Section B details the history of knives as militia arms. Heller’s
determination that handguns are within the scope of the Second
Amendment was mainly based on the fact that handguns are useful
for self-defense; Section C shows that knives are also useful for self-
defense. Courts that have interpreted the Second Amendment have
recognized the enormous technological improvements in firearms
since 1791. In contrast, as Section D explains, the knives of today
are not very different from the knives of 1791. Accordingly, Second
Amendment protection of modern knives is especially clear. Part E
argues that, under modern Second Amendment doctrine, the right
to carry knives in public places for lawful self-defense must at least
be co-extensive with the right to carry handguns.
A. Which Arms does the Constitution Protect?
According to District of Columbia v. Heller, the Second Amend-
ment guarantees “the individual right to possess and carry weapons
in case of confrontation.”129 Heller ruled that “the Second Amend-
ment extends, prima facie, to all instruments that constitute
bearable arms,” with “arms” defined (pursuant to a Founding Era
dictionary) as “any thing that a man . . . takes into his hands, or
useth . . . to cast at or strike another.”130
As a starting point, all knives seem to be within the scope of the
Second Amendment, just as all firearms are. Like firearms, a knife
can be carried by an individual and used as a weapon. Of course,
some knives, like some firearms, are better suited to this purpose
than others, but all knives and all firearms can be possessed, car-
ried, and used in case of confrontation. The Heller opinion,
however, excludes some types of arms from Second Amendment
protection: “weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens
for lawful purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns.”131
129. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008).
130. Id. at 581–82 (quoting T. CUNNINGHAM, 1 A NEW AND COMPLETE LAW DICTIONARY
(1764)).
131. Id. at 625. For an application, see People v. Yanna, 824 N.W.2d 241, 242, 245 (2012)
(holding unconstitutional a state law “which prohibits possession of Tasers and stun guns by
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Heller makes it clear that the protected arms are not solely those
that are suitable for militia use. The right to bear arms “did not
refer only to carrying a weapon in an organized military unit” but
also included doing so as part “of the natural right of defense.”132
By this reasoning, any weapon that could be used for either militia
duty or for private self-defense qualifies as an “arm.” Although mili-
tia use is not necessary to show that something is a Second
Amendment “arm,” militia use is sufficient to do so. Knives are in-
disputably militia arms.
B. Knives as Militia Arms
Knives have long been part of American military equipment. The
federal Militia Act of 1792 required all able-bodied free white men
between eighteen and forty-five to possess, among other items, “a
sufficient bayonet.”133 This establishes both that knives were com-
mon and were arms for militia purposes. Colonial militia laws
required that men (and sometimes all householders, regardless of
sex) own not only firearms but also bayonets or swords; the laws
sometimes required carrying swords in non-militia situations, such
as when going to church.134 In New England, the typical choice for
private individuals;” Tasers, “while plainly dangerous, are substantially less dangerous than
handguns,” which Heller found protected).
132. Heller, 554 U.S. at 585.
133. Militia Act, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 271 (1792).
134. For laws of the colonies of New Hampshire, New Haven, New Jersey, New Plymouth,
New York, North Carolina, Rhode Island, and Virginia, see: An Act for the Regulating of the
Militia, N.H. May 13, 1718, in ACTS AND LAWS, PASSED BY THE GENERAL COURT OR ASSEMBLY OF
HIS MAJESTIES PROVINCE OF NEW-HAMPSHIRE IN NEW-ENGLAND 91 (B. Green 1726) (requiring
that all soldiers and householders have “a good Sword or Cutlash”); RECORDS OF THE COLONY
AND PLANTATION OF NEW HAVEN, FROM 1638 TO 1649, at 25–26 (Charles J. Hoadly ed., Case,
Tiffany & Co. 1857) (requiring everyone that bears arms have “a sworde”); id. at 131, 201 (all
males aged sixteen to sixty must have “a sword”); AARON LEAMING & JACOB SPICER, THE
GRANTS, CONCESSIONS, AND ORIGINAL CONSTITUTIONS OF THE PROVINCE OF NEW JERSEY 78 (2d
ed., Honeyman & Co. 1881) (1752) (every male aged sixteen to sixty must have “a sword and
belt”); THE COMPACT WITH THE CHARTER AND LAWS OF THE COLONY OF NEW PLYMOUTH 115
(William Brigham ed., Dutton and Wentworth 1836) (every Sunday, one quarter of the men,
on a rotating basis, must carry arms to church; along with a gun and ammunition, carrying a
“sword” was required); 1 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE COLONIAL HISTORY OF THE STATE OF
NEW YORK 50 (Berthold Fernow ed., Weed, Parsons & Co. 1887) (militiamen must have a
good gun and bayonet); An Act for the Better Regulating the Militia of this Government,
N.C. 1715, in 23 THE STATE RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA 29 (Walter Clark ed., Nash Bros.
1904) (a fine for those not appearing with a “well-fixed sword” when ordered); An Act for the
Better Regulating of the Militia, in LAWS AND ACTS OF RHODE ISLAND, AND PROVIDENCE PLAN-
TATIONS MADE FROM THE FIRST SETTLEMENT IN 1636 TO 1705, reprinted in THE EARLIEST ACTS
AND LAWS OF THE COLONY OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS, 1647–1719 at 57,
106–07 (John D. Cushing ed., 1977) (“a Sword or Bayenet”); ACTS AND LAWS, OF HIS MAJES-
TIES COLONY OF RHODE-ISLAND, AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS IN AMERICA 87, reprinted in THE
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persons required to own a bayonet or a sword was the sword be-
cause most militiamen fulfilled their legal obligation to possess a
firearm by owning a “fowling piece” (an ancestor to the shotgun,
particularly useful for bird hunting), and these firearms did not
have studs upon which to mount a bayonet.135
Well after the nation’s founding, knives continued to be an im-
portant tool for many American soldiers. During World War II,
American soldiers, sailors, and airmen wanted and purchased fixed
blade knives, often of considerable dimensions.136 At least in some
units, soldiers were “authorized an M3 trench knife, but many car-
ried a favorite hunting knife.”137 The Marine Corps issued the Ka-
Bar fighting knife.138 As one World War II memoir recounts, “[t]his
deadly piece of cutlery was manufactured by the company bearing
its name. The knife was a foot long with a seven-inch-long by one-
and-a-half-inch-wide blade. . . . Light for its size, the knife was beau-
tifully balanced.”139 Vietnam memoirs report that Ka-Bar and
similar knives were still in use, but “not everybody is issued a Ka-Bar
knife. There are not enough to go around. If you don’t have one,
you must wait until someone is going home from Vietnam and gives
his to you.”140 Even today, some Special Forces units regularly carry
combat knives.141
EARLIEST ACTS AND LAWS OF THE COLONY OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS,
1647–1719 at 135, 223 (John D. Cushing ed., 1977) (“one good Sword, or Baionet”); An Act
for the Better Supply of the Country with Armes and Ammunition, Act 4, Va. Apr. 1684, in 3
THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE FIRST
SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, IN THE YEAR 1619, at 13 (William Waller Hening ed., Samuel
Pleasants 1812) (soldiers must furnish themselves with “a sword, musquet and other furniture
fitt for a soldier”); An Act for the Better Regulation of the Militia, ch. 2, Va. Nov. 1738, in 5
THE STATUTES AT LARGE, supra, at 16–17 (militiamen who are “horse-men” must have a sword
or cutlass).
135. See CLAYTON E. CRAMER, ARMED AMERICA: THE REMARKABLE STORY OF HOW AND WHY
GUNS BECAME AS AMERICAN AS APPLE PIE 97–98 (2006).
136. See Walter E. Burton, Knives for Fighting Men, POPULAR SCIENCE, July 1944, at 150, 150,
153.
137. GORDON L. ROTTMAN, U.S. SPECIAL WARFARE UNITS IN THE PACIFIC THEATER 1941–45,
at 27 (2005).
138. To be precise, “Ka-Bar” is only one manufacturer of post-WWII fighting knives. “Ka-
Bar” is sometimes used in a generic sense, in the same way some people call any cola soda a
“Coke.”
139. E.B. SLEDGE, WITH THE OLD BREED: AT PELELIU AND OKINAWA 21 (Presidio Press
2007) (1981).
140. See, e.g., JOHN CORBETT, WEST DICKENS AVENUE: A MARINE AT KHE SANH 149 (2003).
141. See, e.g., PUSHIES, supra note 23, at 63–64.
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C. Protection Beyond Militia Arms
  The Second Amendment does not protect solely militia arms. As
Heller points out, those in the Founding Era valued firearms in part
because they were useful “for self-defense and hunting.”142 Thus,
knives that are useful for self-defense or hunting are also within the
scope of the Second Amendment.143
In the past, some states imposed special restrictions on certain
types of knives while leaving swords alone.144 Often, the particular
knives singled out for extra restrictions were those that could open
most easily, likely because legislatures feared that such knives would
be used offensively.145
The distinction, however, does not make much sense. Guns can
be used offensively or defensively. The very characteristic that
makes a gun so useful for defense—the ability to project force at a
distance, rather than in close contact—also makes the gun particu-
larly dangerous as an offensive weapon. The difference between
offensive and defensive is not the type of gun but the intent of the
user and the circumstances of use. The same is true for anything
with a blade; the characteristics that make any particular bladed in-
strument handy for self-defense will also make it usable for offense.
Again, the user, not the instrument, is the difference.
The question of whether knives qualify as a type of arm suitable
for self-defense seems almost trivial. Knives are self-evidently useful
for self-defense. Indeed, almost every type of knife would be useful
for self-defense against an attacker armed with fists or other per-
sonal weapons, a knife, or an impact weapon such as a billy club.146
Although a knife is most definitely not an ideal defensive weapon
against an attacker armed with a handgun, at very close range, as is
the case with many crimes of violence, it would generally be more
effective than barehanded defense or begging for mercy.
In some situations, a knife might not be the best choice for self-
defense because to use it requires one to be inches from the at-
tacker. Nonetheless, it can be an effective deterrent to attack for
142. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 599 (2008).
143. A knife that is useful for hunting does not have to be a knife that is useful for taking
the animal; a knife that can be used to clean the meat off the animal would also qualify.
144. E.g., An Act to Suppress the Sale and Use of Bowie Knives and Arkansas Tooth Picks
in this State, ch. 137, 22 Tenn. Gen. Assemb. Acts 200 (1838) (banning carrying or purchas-
ing Bowie knives and Arkansas Toothpicks, but affecting no other weapon).
145. See supra Part I.E–F.
146. There are specialized knives whose blades are surrounded such that they can be
used to cut rope or seat belts but are essentially useless as a stabbing weapon. Butter knives
are also useless for self-defense. A ban on them would not violate the Second Amendment
because they are only useful as tools.
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the same reason that a firearm is; the attacker must decide whether
the risk of being seriously injured or killed justifies continuing the
attack. In at least some situations, the attacker will see the knife and
remember an urgent appointment elsewhere.
Some schools of self-defense instruction, such as Michael Janich’s
Martial Blade Concepts, specialize in teaching defensive knife
use.147 Many people, including police officers carrying defensive
handguns, also carry a backup defensive knife, in case the handgun
malfunctions or runs out of ammunition.148 The Ka-Bar TDI Law
Enforcement knife is designed for this purpose, with a small fixed
blade and a distinctive angled grip made for carrying on a belt.149
A knife may also be the best or only available defensive choice for
persons who, for a variety of reasons, may choose not to own a fire-
arm. Most knives are substantially cheaper than the cheapest
firearm. The poorest Americans are also the most at risk of being
victims of crime.150 A ten-dollar knife may be an option where a
$130 used rifle is not.
Similarly, a person who chooses a knife for self-defense may live
in an area where firearms (even after the McDonald v. Chicago deci-
sion, which incorporated the Second Amendment against state and
local government151) are more strictly regulated than knives. For
example, a knife that can be bought and taken home right away
provides at least some protection during the period of days, weeks,
or months that it may take to get government permission to own a
firearm.
A person may also be reluctant to own a firearm out of concern
that he may be unable to adequately secure it from his children.
Although knives are still dangerous, a parent may conclude that the
danger of a knife is sufficiently self-evident to a child, and that it
represents a very minor risk compared to a firearm. While many
people keep their guns in a safe or lockbox, almost every home has
147. See MARTIAL BLADE CONCEPTS: PRACTICAL PERSONAL-DEFENSE SKILLS FOR TODAY’S
WORLD, http://www.martialbladeconcepts.com/Home.aspx (last visited Aug. 20, 2013).
148. See, e.g., Greg Ellifritz, Should Police Officers Carry Fixed Blade Knives?, ACTIVE RESPONSE
TRAINING (Feb. 4, 2013), http://www.activeresponsetraining.net/should-police-officers-carry-
fixed-blade-knives; Randall, Police Knives: Carrying and Training, BLUESHEEPDOG.COM, http://
www.bluesheepdog.com/police-knives/ (last visited Aug. 20, 2013).
149. TDI Law Enforcement Knife, KA-BAR, http://www.kabar.com/knives/detail/76 (last
visited Aug. 20, 2013).
150. See PATSY KLAUS & CATHY MASTON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CRIMINAL VICTIMI-
ZATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1995, at 21 tbl.14 (2000) (victimization rates by annual family
income: 75.0/1,000 for those from families with income below $7,500, dropping consistently
in every income category to 37.7/1,000 for those at $75,000 per year and above).
151. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
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several kitchen knives lying in drawers or in a block on the kitchen
counter.
The fact that knives in general may be less effective for self-de-
fense than handguns does not generally strip knives of Second
Amendment protection. Whether a particular arm is the ideal
choice for self-defense does not affect whether that arm is constitu-
tionally protected. In Heller, Dick Heller owned a .22 caliber
revolver, which is about the weakest self-defense firearm possible.152
The Court upheld Mr. Heller’s right to own the gun, despite the
fact that a higher caliber handgun would be more effective at stop-
ping an attacker.153 Likewise, a folding knife with a three-inch blade
is not as powerful a defensive arm as a sword or a handgun. The
Second Amendment protects individual discretion to choose which
defensive arm is most suitable for the individual, based on his or
her particular circumstances.
D. Technological Changes
Heller explicitly rejected the notion that the Second Amendment
protects only the types of arms that were in existence in 1789, when
Congress sent the Second Amendment to the states for ratifica-
tion.154 Claiming that the Second Amendment only protects 1789
guns is like saying that the First Amendment protects only the hand
cranked printing press and not television. On the other hand, if a
particular firearm model is a modern equivalent of a 1789 flintlock
rifle, musket, or 1789 handgun, then it is clear that such a firearm is
within the Second Amendment’s scope.
Virtually every modern knife is comparable to the knives of 1789.
Knives and other edged weapons were at least as common in En-
glish and U.S. society in the eighteenth century as they are today,
appearing frequently in a variety of contexts. They were commonly
152. Compare .22 Results in fps, BALLISTICS BY THE INCH, http://www.ballisticsbytheinch.
com/22.html (last visited Aug. 20, 2013), with .25 Auto Results in fps, BALLISTICS BY THE INCH,
http://www.ballisticsbytheinch.com/25auto.html (last visited Aug. 20, 2013).
153. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 629–31 (2008) (upholding Heller’s
right to possess a handgun in his home); see also Jorge Amselle, Choosing the Best Caliber for Self-
Defense, AMERICAN RIFLEMAN (May 4, 2011), http://www.americanrifleman.org/articles/best-
caliber-self-defense/ (“[The .38 special] cartridge is considered by many experts to be the
minimum necessary for adequate personal protection.”); Paul W. Abel, Calibers for Defense,
SHOOT-N-IRON PRAC. SHOOTING & TRAINING ACAD., http://www.shoot-n-iron.com/calibers-
for-defense.asp (last visited Aug. 22, 2013) (“I personally do not recommend either [.32 or
.25 calibers] for defensive purposes. Both calibers are lacking in velocity and bullet
expansion.”).
154. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 582.
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sold, carried, used as tools,155 and occasionally misused as offensive
weapons.156
While modern knives are made of superior materials, from a
functional perspective knives have advanced far less since 1789 than
have firearms, printing presses, or the myriad of other technologies
whose constitutional protections are indisputable.157 Even the
switchblade is old; the first spring-ejected blades appeared in Eu-
rope in the late eighteenth century.158
Gun prohibition advocates have long argued that modern fire-
arms are far more deadly than single-shot, muzzle-loading firearms
of 1789 and thus do not enjoy the protections of the Second
Amendment.159 They lost that argument in Heller.160 There is no
similar argument with respect to knives. While firearms have
changed from single-shot to multi-shot, the knives of 2013 have ex-
actly one blade, just like the knives of 1789.
155. See, e.g., W. LUDLAM, AN INTRODUCTION AND NOTES, ON MR. BIRD’S METHOD OF DIVID-
ING ASTRONOMICAL INSTRUMENTS 6 (1786) (for making astronomical instruments); PHILIP
LUCKOMBE & WILLIAM CASLON, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE ORIGIN AND PROGRESS OF PRINTING
351 (1770) (used in setting type); TEMPLE HENRY CROKER ET AL., 3 THE COMPLETE DICTIONARY
OF ARTS AND SCIENCES, “Tanning Engines” (describing the machine used for tanning
leather).
156. See, e.g., King v. Hardy, in THE PROCEEDINGS IN CASES OF HIGH TREASON, UNDER A
SPECIAL COMMISSION OF OYER AND TERMINER 303–05 (1794) (a merchant in London describ-
ing his sale of knives with springs that hold them open; “they lay in my show glass, and in the
window for public sale.”); King v. Chetwynd, NO. 8 PART 3 THE PROCEEDINGS ON THE KING’S
COMMISSIONS OF THE PEACE, AND OYER AND TERMINER 313 (1743) (a dispute over a slice of a
cake led to an assault involving a pocket knife); Particulars of Margaret Nicholson’s Attempt to
Assassinate His Majesty, 10 THE EUROPEAN MAG., AND LONDON REV. 117 (1786) (describing
Margaret Nicholson’s attempt on King George III’s life).
157. See Clayton E. Cramer & Joseph Edward Olson, Pistols, Crime and Public, 44 WIL-
LIAMETTE L. REV. 699, 716–22 (2008) (comparing firearms to other advancing technologies
which enjoy constitutional protections).
158. TIM ZINSER ET AL., SWITCHBLADES OF ITALY 7–8 (2003).
159. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 582 (“Some have made the argument, bordering on the frivo-
lous, that only those arms in existence in the 18th century are protected by the Second
Amendment.”).
160. Id. (“We do not interpret constitutional rights that way. Just as the First Amendment
protects modern forms of communications, e.g., Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521
U.S. 844, 849 (1997), and the Fourth Amendment applies to modern forms of search, e.g.,
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 35–36 (2001), the Second Amendment extends, prima
facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in existence
at the time of the founding.”).
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E. The Scope of the Right to Keep and Bear Knives
Heller addressed not only the right to keep a gun in the home but
also the right to bear arms. Although Heller allows carry bans in “sen-
sitive places,” the opinion recognized a general right to carry.161
Some lower courts have resisted Heller’s language about the right to
carry, and the issue may need another Supreme Court case for a
final resolution.162
Today, in forty-two states, adults who pass a fingerprint-based
background check and a safety training class can obtain a permit to
carry a handgun for lawful protection.163 As a practical matter, the
right to bear arms is already in effect in these states. In some states,
these licenses are specifically for concealed handguns and do not
allow the licensee to carry a concealed knife.164 The reason for this
peculiar situation is that these laws were enacted with the support
of the National Rifle Association and other gun rights activist
groups that were concerned about the right to carry firearms and
did not pay attention to other arms, such as knives.165 A few years
ago, Knife Rights—the first proactive organization dedicated to
161. See id. at 584 (“At the time of the founding, as now, to ‘bear’ meant to ‘carry.’ When
used with ‘arms,’ however, the term has a meaning that refers to carrying for a particular
purpose—confrontation.”) (citations omitted).
162. See, e.g., Smith v. U.S., 20 A.3d 759, 764 (D.C. 2011) (affirming the conviction of a
Washington, D.C. police officer, wrongfully terminated and awaiting reinstatement, who was
arrested for carrying a handgun within the District); Piszczatoski v. Filko, 840 F. Supp. 2d
813, 820 (D.N.J. 2012) (“The Second Amendment does not protect an absolute right to carry
a handgun for self-defense outside the home, even if the Second Amendment may protect a
narrower right to do so for particular purposes under certain circumstances.”); Richards v.
County of Yolo, 821 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1174 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (“Based upon this, Heller cannot
be read to invalidate Yolo County’s concealed weapon policy, as the Second Amendment
does not create a fundamental right to carry a concealed weapon in public.”). But see Moore
v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 942 (7th Cir. 2012) (overturning a ban on carrying in any form,
open or concealed); People v. Aguilar, 2013 IL 112116 (Second Amendment is violated by a
general ban on bearing arms).
163. Clayton E. Cramer & David B. Kopel, “Shall Issue”: The New Wave of Concealed Hand-
gun Permit Laws, 62 TENN. L. REV. 679 (1995); O’Shea, supra note 109, at 598–601. With the
exception of California, Delaware, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York,
and Rhode Island, all the other states have an objective process by which most law-abiding
adults can obtain a permit to carry, or do not need a permit. See generally BUREAU OF ALCO-
HOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES, STATE LAWS AND PUBLISHED ORDINANCES —
FIREARMS (31st ed. 2011), available at https://www.atf.gov/files/publications/download/p/
atf-p-5300-5-31st-editiion/2010-2011-atf-book-final.pdf.
164. Oregon is fairly typical in prohibiting concealed carry of any knife “that projects or
swings into position by force of a spring or by centrifugal force [or] any dirk [or] dagger,”
OR. REV. STATS. § 166.240 (2011), but allows concealed carry of a firearm if licensed, id.
§§ 166.250, .291. Idaho, by comparison, prohibits carrying “any dirk, dirk knife, bowie knife,
dagger, pistol, revolver or any other deadly or dangerous weapon” unless the carrier is li-
censed to carry a concealed weapon. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-3302(7) (2013).
165. See About NRA-ILA, NRA-ILA, http://www.nraila.org/about-nra-ila.aspx (last visited
Aug. 20, 2013).
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knives—was created.166 Had such an organization existed when
these concealed carry laws were enacted, inclusion of knives would
have been more likely.
Given the current understanding of the Second Amendment and
the criminological evidence discussed above, if a state government
decides that a particular individual is responsible enough to carry a
concealed, loaded handgun in public places throughout the state,
the state cannot forbid that person from carrying a concealed knife.
V. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Post-Heller courts are using a wide variety of analytical tools to
evaluate Second Amendment claims. Sometimes, a statute is so
flagrantly unconstitutional that there is no need to formulate a
multi-step test.167 A law that prohibits activity “near” the core right
of self-defense (such as a ban on target ranges) may receive “not-
quite strict scrutiny.”168 Alternatively, a court might apply the “his-
tory and tradition” test.169 Some courts have used intermediate
scrutiny, particularly for laws that involve persons who have already
demonstrated themselves to be more likely than most to misuse a
firearm.170 This Part tests some knife laws against the weakest
possible relevant standard, intermediate scrutiny.171 Although inter-
mediate scrutiny is not the correct standard in all cases, these
analyses are telling because if a knife control fails intermediate
scrutiny, then it will fail all of the more rigorous standards as well.
As U.S. v. Skoien states, “[i]n its usual formulation, [the interme-
diate scrutiny] standard of review requires the government to
establish that the challenged statute serves an important govern-
mental interest and the means it employs are substantially related
166. See Richard Grant, Move Over, NRA. Meet the Knife Lobby, MOTHER JONES (Nov./Dec.
2012), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/12/knife-rights-second-amendment.
167. See, e.g., Moore, 702 F.3d at 942 (holding a near-complete ban on bearing arms
unconstitutional).
168. See, e.g., Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 708–09 (7th Cir. 2011) (granting a
preliminary injunction against a ban on firing ranges).
169. See Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1274–75 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (suggesting that restrictions be analyzed under an approach
based on text, history, and tradition).
170. See, e.g., United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 641–44 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc)
(applying something similar to intermediate scrutiny to a ban on possessing firearms for
persons convicted of domestic violence misdemeanors).
171. Rational basis is not available because a fundamental right is involved. See District of
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 n.27 (2008); McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct.
3020, 3050 (2010).
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to the achievement of that interest.”172 Courts have repeatedly held
that, under intermediate scrutiny, it is not enough for the govern-
ment to assert that it has a legitimate public interest.173 In Turner
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, the Court ruled that, under interme-
diate scrutiny, the government “must demonstrate that the recited
harms are real, not merely conjectural, and that the regulation will
in fact alleviate these harms in a direct and material way.”174
This Part applies intermediate scrutiny to three particular types
of knife laws: laws that ban possessing certain knives in the home
(Section A), laws that allow carrying knives for some purposes but
not for self-defense (Section B), and laws that allow carrying hand-
guns but not knives (Section C). The Article argues that all three
types of laws fail intermediate scrutiny.
A. Home Possession
Criminal prosecutions for home possession of knives are rare, for
the obvious reason that only in unusual circumstances would such
possession come to the attention of law enforcement. Nevertheless,
the statutes on home possession violate the Second Amendment be-
cause law-abiding persons are not able to possess certain knives in
their homes. Most jurisdictions that have a ban on home possession
of a certain knife also forbid the sale of such a knife, thus making it
doubly impossible for a law-abiding person to have the knife at
home.
Justifying a ban on home possession or the sale or transfer of a
constitutionally protected arm requires the government to offer
more than “impressionistic observations” in order to pass interme-
diate scrutiny.175 The government must also demonstrate that
replacing the banned category of knives with some other, equally
dangerous arm would not easily defeat the ban. For example, a ban
on revolvers with two-inch barrels would have no public safety bene-
fit if semiautomatic pistols of similar dimensions remained legal. As
long as the purchase and possession of a ten-inch Wusthof Chef’s
172. U.S. v. Skoien, 587 F.3d 803, 805 (7th Cir. 2009), vacated en banc, 614 F.3d 638 (7th
Cir. 2010).
173. See, e.g., Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 661–66 (1994)
(“This obligation to exercise independent judgment when First Amendment rights are impli-
cated is not a license to reweigh the evidence de novo, or to replace Congress’ factual
predictions with our own. Rather, it is to assure that, in formulating its judgments, Congress
has drawn reasonable inferences based on substantial evidence.”).
174. Id. at 664.
175. See State v. Delgado, 692 P.2d 610, 612 (Or. 1984).
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Knife is legal, can any knife ban actually produce a genuine reduc-
tion in injuries? Thus, bans on the home possession of switchblades,
gravity knives, Bowie knives, and so on are probably
unconstitutional.
B. Carrying for Limited Purposes
Lower courts still disagree about the scope of the Second
Amendment right to bear arms, and the issue may eventually be
decided by the Supreme Court.176
Even before the Supreme Court directly recognized that the Sec-
ond Amendment protects a right to keep and bear arms for
personal as well as collective uses, there were still other constitu-
tional limits on carry bans. In the 1995 case City of Akron v. Rasdan,
the Ohio Court of Appeals upheld a city ordinance banning the
carrying of knives “having a blade two and one-half inches in length
or longer” against claims of overbreadth and vagueness, but ruled
that the ordinance went too far in prohibiting “an unreasonable
amount of activity that is inherently innocent, harmless, and useful.
The most obvious examples of this type of innocent activity include
carving, hunting, fishing, camping, scouting, and other recreational
activities in which carrying a knife is an integral and often essential
part of that activity.”177
This is an accurate but not comprehensive list. One particularly
important item is missing: self-defense. Because knives with blades
of longer than two and one-half inches are among Second Amend-
ment “arms” post-Heller and especially post-McDonald, Rasdan must
be read as protecting a right to carry such knives for lawful defense
of self and others. The Rasdan court distinguished the Akron ordi-
nance from ordinances that were upheld in decisions such as City of
Seattle v. Riggins and People v. Ortiz because the laws in those other
states provided “a sufficient number of exceptions to criminal liabil-
ity” to qualify as “reasonable exercises of the police power.”178
176. See, e.g., Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding that a near-com-
plete ban on carrying firearms in public is unconstitutional), reh’g denied, 708 F.3d 901 (7th
Cir. 2013); Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that a
statute requiring applicants show a special need for self-protection before being granted a
license to carry did not violate Second Amendment), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1806 (2013)
(denying petition despite seven amicus briefs in support, including a brief from twenty
states).
177. City of Akron v. Rasdan, 663 N.E.2d 947, 950–53 (1995).
178. Id. at 953 (citing City of Seattle v. Riggins, 818 P.2d 1100, 1104 (Wash. Ct. App.
1991); People v. Ortiz, 479 N.Y.S.2d 613, 619 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1984)).
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Notably, the Rasdan court was using the rational basis standard,
but, after Heller and McDonald, rational basis does not suffice.179 If
there is going to be a general ban, with exceptions for permissible
purposes for carrying (e.g., while hunting or hiking), then there
must be an exception that encompasses lawful self-defense. It is pos-
sible that laws which set forth conditions for lawful defensive carry,
such as a licensing system, might be evaluated under intermediate
scrutiny,180 but a law which categorically outlaws defensive carry is
necessarily unconstitutional.181
C. Bans on Carrying Certain Knives but not Handguns
As detailed below in Part VI, some state or local laws allow carry-
ing one knife of a certain blade length while forbidding carrying
another knife that has the same blade length, based on whether the
knife is a folder or a fixed blade, is a folder that can or cannot be
locked, or is a folder that is opened with one mechanism rather
than another. To meet even the intermediate standard of scrutiny,
laws making such distinctions must be based on clear evidence that
these features are a public safety problem, rather than mere conjec-
ture.182 Given that Heller tells us that a handgun ban cannot pass
intermediate scrutiny,183 it seems very doubtful that any of the dis-
tinctions in the above paragraph can pass intermediate scrutiny.
If there is a right to carry handguns, then a ban on carrying a
knife longer than X inches must be based on evidence that such a
knife is more dangerous than a handgun. Given the quality of
twenty-first century handguns, this is an impossible showing. Any
rule of interpretation that allowed more restrictive laws for the
179. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 n.27 (2008); McDonald v. City of
Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010).
180. See, e.g., Kachalsky (2d Cir. 2012).
181. See, e.g., Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011); People v. Aguilar, No.
112116, 2013 WL 112116 (Ill. Sept. 12 2013).
182. In cases on commercial speech and in other First Amendment contexts, the Su-
preme Court has similarly held that “conjecture” does not satisfy the government interest
requirement. See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 392 (2000) (“We
have never accepted mere conjecture as adequate to carry a First Amendment burden.”);
Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770–71 (1993) (noting that the government’s “burden is not
satisfied by mere speculation or conjecture,” but only by “demonstrat[ing] that the harms
[the government] recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a mate-
rial degree”).
183. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628–29 (“Under any of the standards of scrutiny that we have
applied to enumerated constitutional rights, banning from the home ‘the most preferred
firearm in the nation to “keep” and use for protection of one’s home and family,’ would fail
constitutional muster.”).
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bearing of edged weapons than for firearms cannot qualify as allevi-
ating “these harms in a direct and material way” and thus fails
intermediate scrutiny.184
Besides lethality, there are some other ways in which knives are
less dangerous than handguns. A gunshot fired in self-defense may
pass through the criminal and hit an innocent bystander, or a de-
fensive shot may miss the criminal and hit a bystander. The same is
true for criminal misuse of guns.185 These risks occur not only in
public places but also from shots fired within a residence. In con-
trast, a knife used for self-defense has no risk to innocent
bystanders similar to a stray bullet.
Because knives are less dangerous than handguns, which may le-
gally be carried, any law that regulates the possession or carrying of
knives, even the biggest and scariest knives (for those persons who
find them scary), is indefensible under intermediate scrutiny. At
the least, intermediate scrutiny requires an “important” govern-
ment interest;186 it is difficult to see how the government could even
have a rational interest, let alone an important interest, in prevent-
ing the carrying of knives by people who can lawfully carry
handguns.
VI. EXAMPLES OF KNIFE LAWS THAT POSE
CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS
State and local knife laws are often bewilderingly complex, and,
as a result, it is very easy for a person with no criminal intent to
break these laws. Prosecutors and police do not treat the severe
state and local laws as relics of the nineteenth century. Instead, the
laws are often vigorously enforced today against persons who are
not engaged in malum in se behavior.
The enormous political attention on gun regulation means that
most Americans have relatively little idea of the extent to which
knives are subject to startlingly severe laws. These laws frequently
concern carrying but may also forbid manufacture, sale, purchase,
184. See Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994); People v.
Yanna, 824 N.W.2d 241, 244–45 (Mich. App. 2012).
185. See, e.g., Lawrence W. Sherman et al., Stray Bullets and “Mushrooms”: Random Shootings
of Bystanders in Four Cities, 1977–1988, 5 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 297, 297 (1989)
(There was a “rapid increase in both bystander woundings and killings since 1985 in all four
cities. . . . [But] total bystander deaths appear to comprise less than one percent of all homi-
cides in these cities.”); H. Range Hutson et al., Adolescents and Children Injured or Killed in
Drive-By Shootings in Los Angeles, 330 NEW ENG. J. MED. 324, 325 (1994) (“Among the victims
who had firearms injuries, 122 (28 percent) had no gang affiliation . . .”).
186. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
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or even possession in one’s home of a knife. In many respects, the
variations in state and local knife regulation are far more curious
and unexpected than the variations in gun regulation. Even within
a particular state, the variations of what and where something is
legal can be confusing.
One reason for the anomaly is that almost all states have some
form of legislative or judicial preemption for gun control.187 Thus,
in many states, local governments are greatly restricted in what, if
any, gun control laws they may enact, and gun laws are supposed to
be uniform within the state.188 In contrast, only a few states have
knife preemption, and those are recent enactments.189
A. Washington
Washington is one of the many states without knife preemption.
Leslie Riggins was arrested in 1988 in Seattle while waiting for a bus
because he had a knife in a sheath on his belt.190 He was charged
with possession of a fixed blade knife.191 Riggins explained that he
originally intended to go fishing with his brother outside of Seattle,
but because of a change of plans, Riggins had “ended up using the
knife to assist in roofing his brother’s house.”192
Riggins might well have had reason to believe that he was within
his rights to carry the knife. One part of the Seattle ordinance
prohibiting carrying a fixed blade knife exempted “[a] licensed
hunter or licensed fisherman actively engaged in hunting and fish-
ing activity including . . . travel related thereto.”193 When Riggins
started his travels, he had planned to go fishing and thus was within
the “travel related thereto” exemption.194 Another exemption pro-
tected “[a]ny person immediately engaged in an activity related to a
187. Firearms Preemption Laws, NRA-ILA (Dec. 16, 2006), http://www.nraila.org/news-is-
sues/fact-sheets/2006/firearms-preemption-laws.aspx?s=Preemption&st=&ps=.
188. See STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, 2 FIREARMS LAW DESKBOOK app. A (2010).
189. See Act of Apr. 29, 2010, ch. 204, 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1005 (codified at ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-3120 (2012)) (first state to preempt knife laws); Restrictions on Political
Subdivisions Regarding the Regulation of Knives, ch. 272, 2011 Utah Laws 1092 (codified at
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-8-47.5, 17-50-332 (2012)); An Act Relative to State Authority Over
Firearms and Ammunition, ch. 139, 2011 N.H. Laws 141 (codified at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 159:26 (2012)); Act of May 2, 2012, act 753, 2012 Ga. Laws (codified at GA. CODE ANN. § 16-
11-136 (2012)).
190. City of Seattle v. Riggins, 818 P.2d 1100, 1101 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991), rev’d, 846 P.2d
1394 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993).
191. SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 12A.14.080(B) (2013).
192. Riggins, 818 P.2d at 1101.
193. MUN. CODE § 12A.14.100(A).
194. See Riggins, 818 P.2d at 1101.
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lawful occupation which commonly requires the use of such knife,
provided such knife is carried unconcealed.”195 Here is where Rig-
gins ended up in trouble. Earlier in the day, Riggins had been using
the knife for such a purpose (roofing his brother’s house), but by
the time he returned home by bus, he was no longer immediately
engaged in that activity.196 At this point, his only hope for an ex-
emption from the “dangerous knife” carrying ban would have been
“carrying such knife in a secure wrapper or in a tool box.”197
The state appellate court held that Riggins did not fall within
“any one of the three fairly broad exemptions” to Seattle’s knife
ordinance, and the court was unwilling to recognize that a day that
had started with Riggins’s knife exempted for a fishing trip had
changed as his plans changed.198 Nothing in the Riggins decision
suggests that Riggins had engaged in any behavior that was either
dangerous or criminal. Had Riggins gone fishing with his brother
and, at the end of the day, been returning home by bus, there
would have been no criminal conviction.
Washington has a strong state constitutional guarantee of the
right to keep and bear arms, and the Washington State Supreme
Court has enforced this provision conscientiously when the case has
involved a firearm.199 However, the intermediate appellate court
brushed off Riggins’s constitutional claim, gave the ordinance
“every presumption . . . of constitutionality,” and upheld the Seattle
ordinance under a mere “reasonable and substantial” test.200
The Riggins decision was in 1991 and involved only the state con-
stitution. Both District of Columbia v. Heller (2008) and McDonald v.
Chicago (2010) struck down bans on the possession of handguns
without even needing to resort to a standard of scrutiny; the ban on
handgun possession in those cases was so plainly contrary to the
constitutional text that there was no need to proceed to choosing a
195. MUN. CODE § 12A.14.100(B).
196. See Riggins, 818 P.2d at 1101, 1104 (“Riggins has failed to show that his conduct falls
within one of the ordinance’s exemptions.”).
197. MUN. CODE § 12A.14.100(C).
198. See Riggins, 818 P.2d at 1102, 1104, rev’d on other grounds, 846 P.2d 1394 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1993).
199. See, e.g., State v. Rupe, 683 P.2d 571, 594–97 (Wash. 1984) (ordering defendant’s
ownership of an AR-15 excluded from penalty phase of murder trial because of chilling effect
on right to keep and bear arms).
200. Riggins, 818 P.2d at 1102–03 (“Where legislation tends to promote the health, safety,
morals, or welfare of the public and bears a reasonable and substantial relationship to that
purpose, every presumption will be indulged in favor of constitutionality.”), rev’d on other
grounds, 846 P.2d 1394 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993).
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level of scrutiny.201 The Riggins approach to the Washington Consti-
tution’s protections is therefore contrary to the approach that the
U.S. Supreme Court outlined for Second Amendment cases since,
according to the Supreme Court, broad bans on ownership or car-
rying (keeping and bearing) are per se unconstitutional. Were
Riggins to come before the Washington Supreme Court today, it
would almost certainly strike down Seattle’s overly broad ban on
carrying such knives. An example of the federal approach to broad
bans after Heller/McDonald occurred in 2012 when the Seventh Cir-
cuit correctly applied the Heller/McDonald model to Illinois, which
was the only state to prohibit defensive gun carrying in public
places.202 Because the ban was per se unconstitutional, Judge Rich-
ard Posner’s decision struck down the Illinois ban without needing
to get into three-tiered scrutiny.203  The Washington State Supreme
Court would be obligated not simply to consider the constitutional-
ity of the Seattle ordinance with respect to the Washington State
Constitution, but with the much more demanding standards of
McDonald.
Alternatively, a future Washington state court might simply apply
the Riggins “substantial” test (which echoes the language of inter-
mediate scrutiny) with some genuine rigor and ask whether there
was any substantial relation to public safety in an ordinance that
would have let a future defendant similarly situated to Riggins carry
his knife home in one way after a day of fishing but required that
he carry it in a different way after a day of roofing. As in any case
involving heightened scrutiny (strict or intermediate), the burden
of proof would be on the government.204 Depending on how the
Supreme Court finally decides what standard of scrutiny to apply to
the Second Amendment, an appeal to the Second Amendment
201. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628–29 (2008) (“Under any of the
standards of scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated constitutional rights, banning from
the home ‘the most preferred firearm in the nation to “keep” and use for protection of one’s
home and family,’ would fail constitutional muster.”); McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S.
Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010) (“In Heller, we held that the Second Amendment protects the right to
possess a handgun in the home for the purpose of self-defense. Unless considerations of stare
decisis counsel otherwise, a provision of the Bill of Rights that protects a right that is funda-
mental from an American perspective applies equally to the Federal Government and the
States.”).
202. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/24-1 (2011), invalidated by Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d
933 (7th Cir. 2012); People v. Aguilar, No. 112116, 2013 WL 112116, at *5–8 (Ill. Sept. 12
2013) (Striking down a comprehensive ban on carrying loaded firearms in public places and
by someone who was hardly an upstanding citizen: “That said, we cannot escape the reality
that in this case, we are dealing not with a reasonable regulation but with a comprehensive
ban.”).
203. See Madigan, 702 F.3d at 941–42.
204. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 196–204 (1976).
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might produce a similar result to Riggins, or strike down the Seattle
ordinance.
B. California
Can a person legally carry a knife in California? He can carry a
fixed blade knife on California’s college campuses if the blade is
not longer than two-and-one-half inches.205 Folding knives are un-
restricted by state law on college campuses,206 though some
campuses may have more restrictive rules. On primary and secon-
dary school grounds, the law is the same for fixed blades as on
college campuses (banned if more than two-and-one-half inches),
but all folding knives are banned, regardless of blade length, if the
blade can lock open.207 On the other hand, a person can carry a
knife with a fixed blade up to four inches into a government build-
ing.208 He can also carry a folding knife into a government building
with a blade up to four inches, but only if the blade does not lock
open.209
Heller affirmed the permissibility of special restrictions on arms
carrying in “sensitive places, such as schools and government build-
ings.”210 However, even presuming that California can legally enact
some special restrictions on knife carrying in those places, the ac-
tual restrictions are irrational. There is no reason why lock-blade
folders are allowed and non-locking folders are banned in one loca-
tion while just the opposite is the rule in another location.
For carrying in public places in general (not in sensitive places),
California law is at least coherent at the state level. A person can
openly carry any knife. He can concealed carry almost any folding
knife. The one exception is that he cannot carry a switchblade with
a blade longer than two inches in any fashion, open or
concealed.211
However, California has no preemption for knife laws, and some
California cities, such as Los Angeles, Oakland, and San Francisco,
have their own, more restrictive (and inconsistent) ordinances. Los
Angeles prohibits open carry of knives with blades that are three
205. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 626.10(b) (West 2013).
206. See id.
207. Id. § 626.10(a). A folder that does not lock open is more dangerous because the
blade might fold in unexpectedly and cut a hand. Persons who are familiar with knife safety
therefore usually prefer to carry folders that lock open.
208. See id. § 171b(3).
209. Id.
210. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008).
211. CAL. PENAL CODE § 21510 (West 2012).
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inches or longer (with some exemptions).212 Similarly, Oakland
prohibits carrying knives with blades three inches or longer, but
also “any snap-blade or spring-blade knife” (older terms for switch-
blades), regardless of knife length.213 San Francisco prohibits
loitering while carrying a concealed knife with a blade three inches
or more long, or carrying a concealed switchblade knife of any
length.214 Because of the complexity of California state laws and lo-
cal ordinances, it would be very easy to unintentionally break the
law while carrying a knife with no criminal intent.
C. District of Columbia
The District of Columbia is already famous for its unusual and
extreme firearms laws, some of which were struck down in Heller
and others of which are the subjects of ongoing litigation.215 The
District is also the home of equally severe knife laws. D.C. law pro-
hibits not only carrying a pistol without a license but also “any
deadly or dangerous weapon capable of being so concealed.”216
This prohibition applies not simply in public places; the statute
adds an additional penalty for doing so “in a place other than the
person’s dwelling place, place of business, or on land possessed by
the person.”217
It does not matter whether the knife is actually carried con-
cealed. The fact that the knife is concealable makes open carrying a
crime. The punishment for carrying in the home is “a fine of not
more than $1,000 or imprisonment for not more than 1 year, or
both.”218 In other words, carrying a carving knife (or even a paring
knife) to the dining room table in the District of Columbia appears
to be a criminal offense.
Prosecutions for home carry of knives seem to be rare in D.C.,
likely because such carrying would rarely come to the attention of
212. LOS ANGELES, CAL., MUN. CODE § 55.10 (2012) (exemptions include “where a person
is wearing or carrying a knife or dagger for use in a lawful occupation, for lawful recreational
purposes, or as a recognized religious practice, or while the person is traveling to or re-
turning from participation in such activity.”).
213. OAKLAND, CAL., MUN. CODE §§ 9.36.010–.020 (2012).
214. SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., MUN. POLICE CODE, art. 17 § 1291 (2012).
215. See Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1248–49 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(affirming basic registration requirements for rifles and a ban on many semi-automatic rifles
and on detachable rifle magazines holding more than ten rounds, while remanding for fur-
ther consideration of long gun registration period and of unusual registration requirements
for all guns, such as fingerprinting, training, and periodic re-registration).
216. See D.C. CODE § 22-4504(a) (2012).
217. Id.
218. Id. § 22-4515.
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law enforcement. In Heller, the Supreme Court struck down a simi-
lar D.C. ban on carrying guns that even prohibited a person who
had a lawfully registered rifle in the home from carrying the gun
from the bedroom into the kitchen in order to clean it.219 Like the
D.C. gun carry ban, the D.C. knife carry ban is grotesquely over-
broad and a plain violation of the Second Amendment.
D. New York
Glenn Reynolds’s recent article, Second Amendment Penumbras, ar-
gues that, by analogy to the First Amendment, the “chilling effect”
doctrine should be applied to the right to keep and bear arms.220
While Reynolds’s arguments concern firearms, they just as accu-
rately apply to knife laws. Many restrictions and regulations
adopted “[d]uring our nation’s interlude of hostility toward guns in
the latter half of the twentieth century” suggest that:
the underlying goal is to discourage people from having any-
thing to do with firearms at all. . . . At present, Americans face
a patchwork of gun laws that often vary unpredictably from
state to state, and sometimes from town to town. Travelers
must thus either surrender their Second Amendment rights,
or risk prosecution.221
One example of the chilling effect of knife regulation comes
from New York City. Defendant John Irizarry was arrested in Brook-
lyn when a police officer noticed a folding knife sticking out of his
pocket.222 The police officer decided (as it turns out, incorrectly)
that this was a gravity knife223 and stopped Irizarry. Irizarry ex-
plained that he used the “Husky Sure-Grip Folding Knife” as part of
his job, as did indeed turn out to be the case. The police officer
arrested him anyway, leading to the discovery of a concealed pistol.
Irizarry sought to suppress the discovery of the pistol because the
search was subsequent to an arrest for something that was not a
crime. The federal court ruled in Irizarry’s favor because the knife
in question was not a gravity knife within the definition of New York
219. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 630–31, 635 (2008).
220. Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Second Amendment Penumbras, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 247, 251
(2012).
221. Id. at 251–52.
222. United States v. Irizarry, 509 F. Supp. 2d 198, 199 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
223. The precise definition of a “gravity knife” is discussed supra Part III.E. Irizarry’s knife
was plainly not a gravity knife. See id. at 210.
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law, but also because “[t]he widespread and lawful presence of an
item in society undercuts the reasonableness of an officer’s belief
that it represents contraband.”224 The defendant’s Husky Sure-Grip
Folding Knife is a proprietary product sold by Home Depot, which
sold 67,341 units in 2006 in New York state alone.225 The manufac-
turer of a competing but similar knife reported that it sold
1,765,091 units nationally in 2006.226 Although the courts did even-
tually find in Irizarry’s favor, any observer of what happened would
rightly conclude that carrying even a completely legal knife in New
York City is looking for trouble with the police. These onlookers
would therefore choose not to exercise their constitutional right to
carry knives, meaning their conduct would be chilled.
The courts ruled for Irizarry, but the New York City government
did not learn its lesson. In 2010, Manhattan District Attorney Cyrus
Vance, Jr. threatened criminal charges against Home Depot, Ace
Hardware, and a number of hardware, general, and sporting goods
retailers for selling knives that the District Attorney characterized as
“illegal knives.”227 As a result of the threat of criminal prosecution
and to avoid going to trial on charges, these retailers signed settle-
ment agreements and turned over $1.9 million to finance a so-
called public education campaign and other anti-knife efforts by
the District Attorney.228
The specific claimed violations in this instance involved gravity
knives or switchblades. Again, as in the Irizarry case, Home Depot
pointed out that “[t]hese are common knives” often used in con-
struction and home improvement projects.229 Some of the arrests
associated with these “illegal knives” demonstrate that the defini-
tion of “gravity knife” under New York law is subject to abusive
prosecution. New York police arrested the noted painter John
Copeland a few months after District Attorney Vance’s aforemen-
tioned settlement with the chain stores for carrying a Benchmade
three-inch folding knife, on the allegation that it was a “gravity
knife.”230
Although charges were eventually dropped against Copeland be-
cause his lawyer was able to show that Copeland is a serious artist
224. Id. at 209.
225. Id. at 203–04.
226. Id. at 204.
227. See Press Release, N.Y. Cnty. Dist. Attorney’s Office, supra note 53.
228. See id.
229. John Eligon, 14 Stores Accused of Selling Illegal Knives, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/18/nyregion/18knives.html?_r=1&.
230. See Melissa Grace, Artist Furious for Being Busted on Weapons Possession Over a Pocket
Knife He Uses for Work, DAILY NEWS (Jan. 26, 2011), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/
artist-furious-busted-weapons-possession-pocket-knife-work-article-1.155163#ixzz2KSCt0Z5z.
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and used the knife in his work for cutting canvas,231 it does not take
much effort to imagine the results if someone who lacked a na-
tional reputation or a well-paid attorney had been arrested under
the same circumstances. Police arrested Copeland because they
thought that they saw a knife in his pants pockets. There was no
allegation of any criminal misuse.232
Another example of the zeal with which New York City enforces
its knife laws—with no connection to criminal misuse—is the story
of Clayton Baltzer. Baltzer’s “fine-arts class at Baptist Bible College
& Seminary in Clarks Summit, Pa.” went on a field trip to the Met-
ropolitan Museum of Art.233 In a subway station, a plainclothes
police officer grabbed Baltzer by the arm because his pocketknife
clip was visible.234 Unlike Copeland, Baltzer was convicted and sen-
tenced to a $125 fine and two days of community service. Baltzer
has learned his lesson: “I don’t plan on visiting New York unless I
have to.”235
E. State Regulation of Switchblades
One of the most important state supreme court decisions regard-
ing knives is State v. Delgado.236 There, the Oregon Supreme Court
struck down Oregon’s ban on the manufacture, sale, transfer, carry-
ing, or possession of switchblades on the grounds that it violated
231. Id.
232. See id.
233. Jeb Phillips, Bible-College Student’s Pocketknife Spoils Trip to New York City, COLUMBUS
DISPATCH (June 12, 2012), http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2012/06/12/
knife-trouble-in-a-new-york-minute.html.
234. New York City’s Administrative Code has the unusual requirement that all knives be
carried concealed. See N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 10-133 (2010). The officer interpreted the
visibility of the clip as a violation of the law:
Baltzer has carried a pocketknife almost everywhere since he was a 14-year-old camp
counselor. He clips it on his pocket so that the clip is visible, but the knife isn’t. He
always uses two hands to open it, the way most people would a regular pocketknife. . . .
In Baltzer’s telling, the officer tried to flick it open and couldn’t. He handed it to
another officer, who did flick it open after several tries.
Baltzer was arrested and charged with the highest degree of misdemeanor under New
York law. He had another knife in his backpack, a fixed-blade one he used to whittle
for kids at a special-needs camp in Pennsylvania. He forgot he had it in his bag. Police
confiscated that one, too.
Phillips, supra note 233.
235. Phillips, supra note 233.
236. State v. Delgado, 692 P.2d 610 (Or. 1984).
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the Oregon Constitution’s “right to bear arms” provision.237 The de-
fendant, Joseph Delgado, “was walking with a companion on a
public street. The two appeared disorderly to an officer nearby, and
when the defendant reached up as he passed a street sign and
tapped or struck it with his hand, the officer confronted both indi-
viduals and conducted a pat down search.”238 In the course of that
search, officers found a switchblade knife concealed in Delgado’s
pocket, which he claimed that he carried for self-defense.239
The Oregon Supreme Court built upon a previous decision, State
v. Kessler, which had recognized that “the term ‘arms,’ as contem-
plated by the constitutional framers, was not limited to firearms but
included those hand-carried weapons commonly used for personal
defense.”240 Kessler had recognized that possession of billy clubs was
protected in one’s home.241 Delgado extended Kessler’s decision and
recognized that a switchblade knife was also a protected arm under
the state’s constitution.242
The state argued that the switchblade knife “is an offensive
weapon used primarily by criminals.”243 The Oregon Supreme
Court decided that the distinction between defensive and offensive
weapons was unpersuasive because the characteristics of defensive
and offense of weapons strongly overlap: “It is not the design of the
knife but the use to which it is put that determines its ‘offensive’ or
‘defensive’ character.”244
The Oregon Supreme Court also engaged in originalist analysis,
observing that possessing and carrying pocketknives is deeply em-
bedded in European and American history. The court wrote that
“knives have played an important role in American life, both as
tools and as weapons. The folding pocketknife, in particular, since
the early 18th century has been commonly carried by men in
America and used primarily for work, but also for fighting.”245
What about the switchblade? The state had argued that the
switchblade is fundamentally different from its historical ancestor,
the folding pocketknife, which would have been known when the
Oregon Constitution was drafted in 1859. The Oregon Supreme
Court was not persuaded:
237. Id. at 610.
238. Id. at 611.
239. Id.
240. See id. at 611 (citing State v. Kessler, 614 P.2d 94, 98 (Or. 1980)).
241. Kessler, 614 P.2d at 100.
242. Delgado, 692 P.2d at 611, 614.
243. Id. at 612.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 613–14.
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We are unconvinced by the state’s argument that the switch-
blade is so “substantially different from its historical antece-
dent” (the jackknife) that it could not have been within the
contemplation of the constitutional drafters. They must have
been aware that technological changes were occurring in
weaponry as in tools generally. . . . This was the period of de-
velopment of the Gatling gun, breach loading rifles, metallic
cartridges and repeating rifles. The addition of a spring to
open the blade of a jackknife is hardly a more astonishing in-
novation than those just mentioned.246
The Oregon Supreme Court noted that the 1958 Federal Switch-
blade Act was based on the theory that switchblades were “almost
exclusively the weapon of the thug and the delinquent.”247 The Del-
gado court, however, observed that the relevant congressional
testimony “offers no more than impressionistic observations on
the criminal use of switch-blades.”248 The Delgado decision did not
completely forbid the state from regulating the manner in which
a switchblade might be carried. The state could prohibit the
concealed carry of a switchblade; the complete prohibition
on sale, transfer, manufacture, or possession, however, was
unconstitutional.249
Unlike Oregon, some states continue to ban even the home pos-
session of switchblades.250 If switchblades are “typically possessed . . .
for lawful purposes,” then the bans are unconstitutional under Hel-
ler. Of course, in a state where switchblades are banned, everyone
who owns a switchblade is, by definition, a criminal. Besides that,
bans on the sale of switchblades will have made it impossible for
law-abiding citizens to obtain them, so the switchblades will not be
in “typical” use in that state. A law passed during a moral panic sixty
years ago might thus end up trumping the Constitution because its
prohibition has made that weapon “not typically possessed . . . for
lawful purposes.”251
We can see this problem in Lacy v. State, in which the Indiana
Court of Appeals upheld a ban on the possession of automatic
knives on the grounds that “switchblades are primarily used by
246. Id. at 614.
247. Id. at 612 (quoting S. REP. NO. 85-1980 (1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3435).
248. Id.
249. See id. at 614.
250. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-12-102 (2012) (possession of gravity or switchblade knives
is a felony, even in one’s home); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-1302 (2012) (possession, manufac-
ture, transportation, repair, or sale of a switchblade knife is a class A misdemeanor).
251. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 625 (2008).
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criminals and are not substantially similar to a regular knife or jack-
knife.”252 If they are illegal, then by definition they will be
“primarily used by criminals,”253 as any prohibited arm would be.
Lacy quotes Crowley Cutlery Co. v. U.S. to refute the Oregon Su-
preme Court’s position in Delgado that switchblade knives are not
intrinsically different from other knives.254 Crowley argued that
switchblade knives “are more dangerous than regular knives be-
cause they are more readily concealable and hence more suitable
for criminal use.”255 It requires no expert testimony to demonstrate
that this claim is incorrect. A switchblade knife’s handle, when
closed, must be at least as long as the blade. In this respect, it is no
different from any folding knife; the enclosure must be slightly
longer than the blade. No switchblade knife can be any more con-
cealable than its non-automatic counterpart.
Besides that, all one need do is look at states where switchblades
are not banned, and one will see that switchblades are indeed typi-
cally possessed by law-abiding citizens for legitimate purposes.
CONCLUSION
Knives are among the “arms” protected by the Second Amend-
ment. They easily fit with the Supreme Court’s Heller definition of
protected arms, namely that they be usable for self-defense and typi-
cally owned by law-abiding citizens for legitimate purposes.
Statutes that ban or impose special restrictions based on how a
knife opens, or on whether an opened knife can be locked open,
cannot survive any form of heightened scrutiny analysis. Indeed,
many laws regulating knives cannot even survive rational basis scru-
tiny.  As we have previously observed, knives are among the arms
that Americans have a right to bear, and their lower lethality rela-
tive to handguns means that there is not even a rational basis for
laws that regulate carrying knives more restrictively than carrying
handguns.
252. Lacy v. State, 903 N.E.2d 486, 492 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
253. See id. at 488, 491–92.
254. Delgado, 692 P.2d at 614 (“We are unconvinced by the state’s argument that the
switch-blade is so ‘substantially different from its historical antecedent’ (the jackknife) that it
could not have been within the contemplation of the constitutional drafters. They must have
been aware that technological changes were occurring in weaponry as in tools generally.”)
255. Crowley Cutlery Co. v. United States, 849 F.2d 273, 278 (7th Cir. 1988). Note that
the plaintiff’s suit had far more serious problems than the question of the criminal nature of
switchblades. The Court of Appeals wrote: “this is not to say that the issue of the Switchblade
Knife Act’s constitutionality necessarily is frivolous. It is the specific grounds articulated by
Crowley that are frivolous, and make the suit frivolous.” Id. at 279.
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This Article has not aimed to resolve definitively every question
about knife laws in the United States. Rather, it has endeavored to
provide a starting point for further study and to examine some of
the prohibitions that may be most clearly unconstitutional under
the Second Amendment. In a practical sense, the most frequent
way that Americans exercise their Second Amendment rights is by
owning and carrying knives. Knife rights are worthy of judicial pro-
tection and of further scholarly study.
